United States v. Noriega 746 F. Supp. 1506 S. D. Fla. 1990 Justia

United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990)

*1507 *1508 *1509 Michael P. Sullivan, Miles H. Maruman, Miami, Florida, Assistant Secretary of Justice, William K. Blyson, Deputy Officer. U. S. Vice Secretary. Officer General, US side

Frank A. Rubino, Steven Colin, Coconate Groma (Florida), John Mei (Miami, Florida), David Lewis (New York), defendant Manuel Antonio Noriga.

Samuel II Birthin (Miami, Florida) is a defendant Lewis del Sid.

Order for class

Horber district judge

The case is discussing various petitions for defendant Manuel Antonio Noriegi and Colonel Lewis del Sidid, calling for the end of the incident in the case of any dru g-related crime.

*1510 This case is an international drama in consideration of the defendant's status and the difficult situation that he was in the court. The appropriate precedent is as follows:

The huge federal jury held in Miami, Florida on February 14, 1988, imported General Manuel Antonio Norieg to the United States, and participated in an international conspiracy that exported cocaine from the United States. He submitted 12 indictments to accuse the import of materials used. General Noregu supports international drug dealers, including all members of Medelinsky Cartel, in charge of the Panama National Security Corps, and from the commander of the Panama Defense Force, in the export and funding of Panama in Panama. It is claimed that he actually used Panama's property to receive rewards to protect. *1507 *1508 *1509 Michael P. Sullivan, Miles H. Maruman, Florida Miami, U. S. Assistant Secretary of Justice, William K. U. S. Vice Secretary. Officer General, US side

Frank A. Rubino, Steven Colin, Coconate Groma (Florida), John Mei (Miami, Florida), David Lewis (New York), defendant Manuel Antonio Noriga.

Samuel II Birthin (Miami, Florida) is a defendant Lewis del Sid.

Order for class

Horber district judge

The case is discussing various petitions for defendant Manuel Antonio Noriegi and Colonel Lewis del Sidid, calling for the end of the incident in the case of any dru g-related crime.

*1510 This case is an international drama in consideration of the defendant's status and the difficult situation that he was in the court. The appropriate precedent is as follows:

The huge federal jury held in Miami, Florida on February 14, 1988, imported General Manuel Antonio Norieg to the United States, and participated in an international conspiracy that exported cocaine from the United States. He submitted 12 indictments to accuse the import of materials used. General Noregu supports international drug dealers, including all members of Medelinsky Cartel, in charge of the Panama National Security Corps, and from the commander of the Panama Defense Force, in the export and funding of Panama in Panama. It is claimed that he actually used Panama's property to receive rewards to protect. *1507 *1508 *1509 Michael P. Sullivan, Miles H. Maruman, Miami, Florida, Assistant Secretary of Justice, William K. Blyson, Deputy Officer. U. S. Vice Secretary. Officer General, US side

Frank A. Rubino, Steven Colin, Coconate Groma (Florida), John Mei (Miami, Florida), David Lewis (New York), defendant Manuel Antonio Noriga.

Samuel II Birthin (Miami, Florida) is a defendant Lewis del Sid.

Order for class

Horber district judge

The case is discussing various petitions for defendant Manuel Antonio Noriegi and Colonel Lewis del Sidid, calling for the end of the incident in the case of any dru g-related crime.

*1510 This case is an international drama in consideration of the defendant's status and the difficult situation that he was in the court. The appropriate precedent is as follows:

Specifically, he arranged for General Noriega to send cocaine from Colombia through Panama to the United States; organized the transshipment and resale of ether and acetone to the Medellín Cartel for chemicals previously occupied by the Panamanian military; provided refuge and a base for continued operations for members of the Medellín Cartel when the Colombian government took measures to curb the activities of drug traffickers after the assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla; agreed to protect a cocaine laboratory in Panama's Darien province; and secured the safe transfer of millions of dollars of drug money from the United States to Panamanian banks. According to the indictment, Noriega traveled to Havana, Cuba, to meet with Cuban President Fidel Castro, who served as an arbitrator in a dispute between Noriega and the cartel that arose from the seizure by the Panamanian military of a drug laboratory where Noriega was paid to provide security services. All of this influence was allegedly used to General Noriega's advantage. Defendant Del Cid was not only a Panamanian military officer, but was also considered General Noriega's secretary. He is accused of acting as General Noriega's liaison, messenger and emissary.

In connection with these activities, the defendants are charged with participating in racketeering activities in violation of the RICO Act (18 U. S. C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d)), conspiring to distribute and import cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 963, and distributing and aiding in the distribution of cocaine with the intent to import into the United States in violation of 21 S. S. ง 959 and 18 S. S. ง 2. Defendant Noriega is further charged with aiding and abetting the preparation of cocaine for shipment to the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. 959 and 18 U. S. C. 2, conspiring to prepare cocaine for importation into the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. 963, and engaging in interstate movement and the introduction of interstate commerce facilities in furtherance of illegal operations in violation of 18 S. S. C. 1952(a)(3) and 18 S. C. 2. Specifically, he is charged with arranging for General Noriega to transport cocaine from Colombia through Panama to the United States, and with orchestrating the transshipment and resale of ether and acetone to the Medellin Cartel for chemicals formerly occupied by the Panamanian military. When the Colombian government took measures to curb the activities of drug traffickers after the assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, he provided refuge and a base for the continued operation of members of the Medellín Cartel, agreed to protect a cocaine laboratory in Panama's Darien province, and ensured the safe transfer of millions of dollars of drug money from the United States to Panamanian banks. According to the indictment, Noriega traveled to Havana, Cuba, to meet with Cuban President Fidel Castro, who acted as a mediator in a dispute between Noriega and the cartel that arose from the seizure by the Panamanian military of a drug laboratory where Noriega was paid to provide security services. All of this influence was allegedly used in favor of General Noriega. Defendant Del Cid was not only a Panamanian military officer, but was also considered General Noriega's secretary. He is accused of acting as a liaison, messenger, and emissary for General Noriega. In connection with these activities, the defendants are charged with participating in racketeering activities in violation of the RICO statute (18 U. S. C. Sections 1962(c) and 1962(d)), conspiring to distribute and import cocaine into the United States in violation of Title 21 U. S. C. Section 963, and distributing and aiding in the distribution of cocaine with the intent to import into the United States in violation of 21 S. S. ง 959 and 18 S. S. ง 2. Defendant Noriega is further charged with aiding and abetting the preparation of cocaine for shipment to the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. 959 and 18 U. S. C. 2, conspiring to prepare cocaine for import into the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. 963, and engaging in the interstate movement and the introduction of interstate commerce facilities to facilitate illegal operations in violation of 18 S. S. 1952(a)(3) and 18 S. C. 2. Specifically, he is charged with arranging for General Noriega to transport cocaine from Colombia through Panama to the United States, and with orchestrating the transshipment and resale of ether and acetone to the Medellin Cartel for chemicals formerly occupied by the Panamanian military. When the Colombian government took measures to curb the activities of drug traffickers after the assassination of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, he provided refuge and a base for the continued operation of members of the Medellín Cartel, agreed to protect a cocaine laboratory in Panama's Darien province, and ensured the safe transfer of millions of dollars of drug money from the United States to Panamanian banks. According to the indictment, Noriega traveled to Havana, Cuba, to meet with Cuban President Fidel Castro, who acted as a mediator in a dispute between Noriega and the cartel that arose from the seizure by the Panamanian military of a drug laboratory where Noriega was paid to provide security services. All of this influence was allegedly used in favor of General Noriega. Defendant Del Cid was not only a Panamanian military officer, but was also considered General Noriega's secretary. He is accused of acting as a liaison, messenger, and emissary for General Noriega. In connection with these activities, the defendants are charged with participating in racketeering activities in violation of the RICO statute (18 U. S. C. Sections 1962(c) and 1962(d)), conspiring to distribute and import cocaine into the United States in violation of Title 21 U. S. C. Section 963, and distributing and aiding in the distribution of cocaine with the intent to import into the United States in violation of 21 S. S. ง 959 and 18 S. S. ง 2. Defendant Noriega is further charged with aiding and abetting the preparation of cocaine for shipment to the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 959 and 18 U. S. C. § 2, conspiring to prepare cocaine for importation into the United States in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 963, and engaging in interstate movement and the introduction of interstate commerce facilities in furtherance of unlawful operations in violation of 18 S. C. § 1952(a)(3) and 18 S. C. § 2.

Next, the court accused General Norigi, ignoring the fact that he was actually hiding himself from the judiciary and was not currently in court, and asked for a special attempt to be a lawyer, but was ignored. 。 Later, General Noregi called on the cancellation of the prosecution that illegal acts, which were allegedly carried out outside the territory of the United States, could be foreign favorite. In fact, lawyers are the top of the country, as a politician, have a court exemption privilege, and the crime of his charges regarding drugs is not subject to subsequent discussions in this court. He said it was a suggestion.

The reason why the court rejected the defendant's claim after hearing the lawyer's claim and examining the exposed memorandum is probably after. At that time, the court said that although the ruling contained political background, at least General Noleeg would be handed over to the United States someday and answered the charges of him. [1] *1511 The first comment was proved much more correct than the second in the following events. Next, the court had been ignored, ignoring the fact that General Noriegi was actually hiding himself from the justice and was not currently in court, but was ignored. I accused. Later, General Noregi called on the cancellation of the prosecution that illegal acts, which were allegedly carried out outside the territory of the United States, could be foreign favorite. In fact, lawyers are the top of the country, as a politician, have a court exemption privilege, and the crime of his charges regarding drugs is not subject to subsequent discussions in this court. He said it was a suggestion.

The reason why the court rejected the defendant's claim after hearing the lawyer's claim and examining the exposed memorandum is probably after. At that time, the court said that although the ruling contained political background, at least General Nolegu would be handed over to the United States someday and answered the charges of him. [1] *1511 The first comment was proved much more correct than the second in the following events. Next, the court accused General Norigi, ignoring the fact that he was actually hiding himself from the judiciary and was not currently in court, and asked for a special attempt to be a lawyer, but was ignored. 。 Later, General Noregi called on the cancellation of the prosecution that illegal acts, which were allegedly carried out outside the territory of the United States, could be foreign favorite. In fact, lawyers are the top of the country, as a politician, have a court exemption privilege, and the crime of his charges regarding drugs is not subject to subsequent discussions in this court. He said it was a suggestion.

Between the indictment and the arrest of the suspects, they became important figures between the United States and General Noriegi. Shortly after, Arria and others confronted Noriegi, who put a machete on the podium and gave an elaborate propaganda speech denouncing the United States. On December 15, 1989, General Noriegi declared a "state of war" between Panama and the United States. The next day, South American soldiers stationed in Panama were on fighting alert, and Panamanian troops shot at South American fighter planes, wounding them and shooting down a Navy wedding couple. Three days later, on December 20, 1989, President Bush ordered South American troops to begin military influence in Panama, with a mission aimed at saving Yankees' lives, restoring democracy, controlling the Panama Canal trade, and capturing General Noriegi for federal charges of US drug hoarding. Before that, South American troops entered the war, and South American authorities organized a ceremony in which Endal Gilerma was sworn in as president, recognizing the United States as the legitimate head of the Panamanian government. In fact, Endal Gilerma had been reported as the winner of the Panamanian presidential elections held a few months earlier.

Soon, Del Sid, the defendant, who had been conducting about 2, 000 Panama soldiers in Chiriki Prefecture, has surrendered to the South American army. He was later relocated under the services of a security institution to fight the drug from the United States for the crime that Del Sid was charged in the process. General Noriegi's detention was not so normal. For a few days, he safely escaped from the U. S. Army, and the U. S. government proposed $ 1 million. In the end, the general fled to Panama's Roman Pope Nunin. With the Noliga at the Pope Nunmin, diplomacy was stalled, and negotiations with the roles of each country were difficult. Initially, the Vatican authorities didn't want to give Noliga to the United States. Meanwhile, South American troops were placed from the outside, and it was found that rock and roll music with a loud loudspeaker resounded in the room, and was in the monastery. The music continued to sound for three days, and the church authorities did not follow the humiliated prospects. Later, the 1 1-day Noriege confrontation was finally surrendered to the South American army due to the pressure of the Roman Pope. Shortly after

The Court faces many issues that will provoke initial excitement, as evidenced by the unusual factual circumstances behind the case. This is the first time that a leader or de facto boss of a sovereign nation has been taken against his will to the United States for criminal prosecution. The fact that the precedent states that General Noriega's arrest took place during a military operation only highlights the complexity of the issues at stake. In addition to Defendant Noriega's request to dismiss the case for lack of tort jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, Defendant Noriega and Defendant Del Cid are in effect saying that they are considered prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. This status, according to the Defendants, deprives the Court of jurisdiction to try the case before them. Separately, Noriega effectively argues that the military action that led to his arrest in 1512 "shocks the conscience" and that the following legal proceedings opinion urgently demands that the Court categorically waive its jurisdiction over his person. Noriega also argues that the invasion took place in violation of international law. Finally, Noriega argues that even if there was no constitutional or contractual violation, the Court is bound to dismiss the charges according to its own judgment.

I. Jurisdiction on Violations of Law

The first question for court is whether the United States may realize a cas e-i n-case case for criminal acts approved by Noriegi. Noriega says, "The application of the criminal law is unreasonable considering the original text of the provided case, and it cannot be applied to secure court rights in relation to the favorite of the relocation of the relocation that is almost unmatched." I am claiming. Illegal acts in the United States. "3] However, the defendant is trying to use a foreign favorite positive status and is trying to use the country's criminal law, and the United States has any opportunities to prohibit acts that occur outside the country. The problem of whether or not is the head of the country, or the difference is clearly maintained from the ownership of the court's prosecution or the exemption of the Noliega-exemption. It is not a concern about the public status of the foreign defendant, but the dissatisfaction with the leaders of the country as a result of the disposal and consequences of the acts under consideration. This is the first question of the

When faced with the question of extraterritoriality, the court must consider: 1) whether the United States has a right to exercise influence over the conduct in accordance with classical principles of international law, and 2) whether the law under which the defendant is charged actually has extraterritorial effect. As Noriega acknowledges, the United States has long had the ability to impose criminal consequences on extrastate influences that have consequences on U. S. soil. Strassheim v Daley, 221 USA 280, 285, 31 S. Ct. 558, 560, 55 L. Ed. 735 (1911); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Act of the United States [hereafter Restatement (Third)] ง 402(1) (c). For example, the United States certainly has the right to prosecute a person in Canada if he fires a bullet across the border and hits another person in the United States. "Every state in the world affirms the principle that those who exercise, with bad faith, outside that state, powers that are supposed to operate in that state, are responsible in the space in which the misdeed is committed." Rivard v. United States, 375 F. 2d 882, 887 (5th Cir.) (cited omitted), certificate denied, 389 U. S. C. 884, 88 S. Ct. 151, 19 L. Ed. 2d 181 (1967). Objective Territory

Obvious acts in the United States to residents in other countries who did not enter the United States and did not perform all actions immediately within the United States territory, but did not enter the United States for the purpose of importing drugs to the United States. On the condition that there is a conspiracy, repeated precedents have been affirmed. In contrast, UNITED STES, 589 F. 2D 862 (5th district), certificate dismissal, 444 U. S. 832, 100 S. S. 832, 100 S. CT. 61, 62 L. ED. 2D 40 (1979); UNITED STES V. Kaden, 585 F. 2D 1252 (5th District, 1978); United States V. Winter, The Certificate Rejected, 423 S. 825, 96 S. CT. 39, 46 L. Ed. 2D 41 (1975); Rivard v. United States, Supra.

Recently, the basics of international law have expanded, and the legal permission has been obtained by ordering plans to produce results in a specific country, and it is necessary to confirm the clear effects and results of the United States of the United States. Is gone. UNITED STES V Wright Barker, 784 F. 2D 161, 168 (3D CIR. 1986); by Contrast, 589 F. 2D AT 886, N. 39; UNITED STATES A, 604 F. 2D at 358 See, 360. Full revision (3rd):

Although it is rarely asserted but not realized, international law does not eliminate the jurisdiction of such a case as long as it follows the principle of rationality. The fact that the plan to perform illegal activities is clear, proven by a certain act, the result caused by those acts is important, and the precedent is predicted, the fact that projects and transactions have been raised. It does not take the jurisdiction of the use of its own law from Myison. "

ง 402, Explanation D.

In the context of drug smuggling, the theory of "intention" had tried to import drugs to the United States, for example, but could not enter the United States or have not allowed drugs in the United States. Even if there is a precedent that there is no act across the US state and the results have not been substantially, there is no jurisdiction over the act of acts that are revealed to the United States. No. The U. S. -Light Barker Incident, the previous book ("((related to drugs)) is to stop brought in their important products to this country and distributed them) ("). Original Mama); UNITED STES V KVEMENER, 789 F. 2D 145, 156 (2D CIR.) ed States v Loilsa-vasqueza, 735 F. 2D 153, 156 (5th District 1984); United States V Baker, 609 F. 2D at 138-39.

These basis have definitely acknowledged the law in this case. Noriegi's indictment accuses Noriegi in conspiracy to import cocaine to the United States, claiming an ideal act of an ideal in the United States to carry out collusion. In particular, the indictment of Noriegi's accomplice has purchased the rear plane in Miami and tracked drug transport from Miami to Panama. Furthermore, Noriegi's work in Panama had the same destructive results in the country, albeit not all, and the bullets released through lines were the same. According to the indictment, at the end of the help of drug transactions in Panama in Noriegi in Miami, 2. 141 pound cocaine was illegally imported. However, US legal abilities that control extraterritorial laws in this country do not depend on the size of the drug imported into the United States and the size of the results, but the import of cocaine of £ 2. 000 is clearly destroyed. It does not include the result, and deserves jurisdiction. After all, the purpose of suspicion conspiracy, including substantially clear acts or results on the border of the territory, was to import cocaine to the United States, clarifying the results. It means that there was a plan.

The defendant's claim that the specification of the approved job in Panam is considered to be unfounded, confirms the foundation of the international law and the law in a situation that affirms such a life. In light of the overwhelming number of facts in this setting, there is no basis. [5] I have not counted the status of foreigners themselves, but in fact, whether it is set here, it gives another problem, and Noliega actually has this problem. It is not distinguished from people who have been given high positions. He mentions (3rd) ง 403 and mentions the rational principle formulated a while ago, but does not say how to spread his jurisdiction in his actions. In fact, the defendant's hyperlink inference is faster in the provided case than the exercise of jurisdiction is irrational. So, for example, Noriega quotes the correct expression from a revised position:

When using rational principles, the embodiment of criminal trials (different from civil) for ideal acts in other countries may be more impressive. These bases have definitely acknowledged the law in this case. Noriegi's indictment accuses Noriegi in conspiracy to import cocaine to the United States, claiming an ideal act of an ideal in the United States to carry out collusion. In particular, the indictment of Noriegi's accomplice has purchased the rear plane in Miami and tracked drug transport from Miami to Panama. Furthermore, Noriegi's work in Panama had the same destructive results in the country, albeit not all, and the bullets released through lines were the same. According to the indictment, at the end of the help of drug transactions in Panama in Noriegi in Miami, 2. 141 pound cocaine was illegally imported. However, US legal abilities that control extraterritorial laws in this country do not depend on the size of the drug imported into the United States and the size of the results, but the import of cocaine of £ 2. 000 is clearly destroyed. It does not include the result, and deserves jurisdiction. After all, the purpose of suspicion conspiracy, including substantially clear acts or results on the border of the territory, was to import cocaine to the United States, clarifying the results. It means that there was a plan.

When using rational principles, the embodiment of criminal trials (different from civil) for ideal acts in other countries may be more impressive. These basis have definitely acknowledged the law in this case. Noriegi's indictment accuses Noriegi in conspiracy to import cocaine to the United States, claiming an ideal act of an ideal in the United States to carry out collusion. In particular, the indictment of Noriegi's accomplice has purchased the rear plane in Miami and tracked drug transport from Miami to Panama. Furthermore, Noriegi's work in Panama had the same destructive results in the country, albeit not all, and the bullets released through lines were the same. According to the indictment, at the end of the help of drug transactions in Panama in Noriegi in Miami, 2. 141 pound cocaine was illegally imported. However, US legal abilities that control extraterritorial laws in this country do not depend on the size of the drug imported into the United States and the size of the results, but the import of cocaine of £ 2. 000 is clearly destroyed. It does not include the result, and deserves jurisdiction. After all, the purpose of suspicion conspiracy, including substantially clear acts or results on the border of the territory, was to import cocaine to the United States, clarifying the results. It means that there was a plan.

When using rational principles, the embodiment of criminal trials (different from civil) for ideal acts in other countries may be more impressive.

US government law enforcement believes that real criminal legislation for working with critical contaminants should be implemented more carefully and only when there are serious reasons than any civil legislation for any work.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Article 403, Reporters' Note 8. Protection for foreign acts is generally limited to crimes that are serious and universally convicted. It is a crime performed by a crime such as state rebellion and drug trafficking, or by the army or for the army. In such a case, it is unlikely that the country in the territory where the act was performed would oppose regulations by the country. (Camma is omitted). Thus, the revised article clearly acknowledges the wisdom of expanding jurisdiction in drug acts claimed in this case. See also United States V. Wright-Barker, 784 F. 2D at 168 (ง 403 is interpreted and the jurisdiction of drug transactions outside the region) is also referred. Even if other countries oppose the jurisdiction of the case, the United States has a strong interest in preventing the inflow of illegal drugs across borders. When evaluating the rationality of the no n-trial jurisdiction, one of the factors to be considered is the subject of regulations, such as the importance of regulation for the supervisory country and how much the regulation is accepted. It is the nature of the activity. RestateMent (Third) ง 403 (1) (C). Agree Restatement (Third) Article 403, Reporters' Note 8. Protection for foreign acts is generally limited to crimes that are serious and universally convicted. It is a crime performed by a crime such as state rebellion and drug trafficking, or by the army or for the army. In such a case, it is unlikely that the country in the territory where the act was performed would oppose regulations by the country. (Camma is omitted). Thus, the revised article clearly acknowledges the wisdom of expanding jurisdiction in drug acts claimed in this case. See also United States V. Wright-Barker, 784 F. 2D at 168 (ง 403 is interpreted and the jurisdiction of drug transactions outside the region) is also referred. Even if other countries oppose the jurisdiction of the case, the United States has a strong interest in preventing the inflow of illegal drugs across borders. When evaluating the rationality of the no n-trial jurisdiction, one of the factors to be considered is the subject of regulations, such as the importance of regulation for the supervisory country and how much the regulation is accepted. It is the nature of the activity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ง 403 (1) (C). RestateMent (Third) Article 403, Reporters' Note 8. Protection for foreign acts is generally limited to crimes that are serious and universally convicted. It is a crime performed by a crime such as state rebellion and drug trafficking, or by the army or for the army. In such a case, it is unlikely that the country in the territory where the act was performed would oppose regulations by the country. (Camma is omitted). Thus, the revised article clearly acknowledges the wisdom of expanding jurisdiction in drug acts claimed in this case. See also United States V. Wright-Barker, 784 F. 2D at 168 (ง 403 is interpreted and the jurisdiction of drug transactions outside the region) is also referred. Even if other countries oppose the jurisdiction of the case, the United States has a strong interest in preventing the inflow of illegal drugs across borders. When evaluating the rationality of the no n-trial jurisdiction, one of the factors to be considered is the subject of regulations, such as the importance of regulation for the supervisory country and how much the regulation is accepted. It is the nature of the activity. RestateMent (Third) ง 403 (1) (c).

Because Noriega's conduct in Panama would have had direct consequences in the United States, the Court finds that extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate under international law.

But the Court's analysis does not end there. Another requirement is that the criminal law under which the defendant is charged must be intended to apply to conduct outside the United States. Noriega is charged with violating 21 USC 959 (distributing controlled substances with knowledge that they will be brought into the United States), 21 USC 952 (importing controlled substances into the United States from abroad), 21 USC 963 (conspiring to commit the above crimes), and 18 USC 2 (aiding and abetting a violation of 959). The indictment also alleges that Noriega violated RICO 1962(c) and 1962(d) by engaging in racketeering activities consisting of the above crimes, and by facilitating the movement and use of funds between states and foreign countries. Trafficking in furtherance of a drug conspiracy in violation of 18 USC 1952(a)(3).

Section 959, which prohibits the distribution of drugs with the intent to introduce them into the United States, is clearly intended to have extraterritorial effect. It states that it is "intended to cover acts of manufacture or distribution occurring outside the territory of the United States." 21 USC ง959(c). In contrast, other statutes do not expressly intend extraterritorial effect. When a statute is silent on extraterritorial application, there is usually a presumption that it applies. United States v. Benitez, 741 F. 2d 1312, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 1984), certificate denied, 471 U. S. C. 1137, 105 S. Ct. 2679, 86 L. Ed. 2d 698 (1985). However, "when the nature of the law permits and Congress so intends, such laws may be applied extraterritorially. In the absence of such express intent in the law, the exercise of these powers may be inferred from the nature of the crime and other legislative efforts of Congress to eradicate such crimes." United States v Baker, 609 F. 2d at 136 (citing United States v Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 97-98, 43 S. Ct. 39, 41, 67 L. Ed. 149 (1922)).

Regarding Article 952 of the United States 21, it is clear from the nature of crime that this law intended to act outside the region. Article 952 prohibits the import of drugs from abroad to the United States. (By the author). In the definition of imports, the court can conclude that ง 952 applies to acts starting abroad, as it means act performed outside the US territorial boundaries. The US vs kaden case, 585 F. 2D AT 1259. Since the jurisdiction of the substantive crime ง 959 and 952 has been established, there is also jurisdiction over conspiracy and accomplishments and incomplete. Because the crime conspiracy is closely related to the crime itself, the court regularly concludes based on the conclusion that substantial legal standards are applied in foreign countries regarding the ง 963 conspiracy. I am. For example, CHUA KHAN MOU V. UNITED STATES, 730 F. 2D 1308, 1311 (9th CIR. 1984), Certificate Denied, 470 U. S. 1031, 105 S. CT. nited States v. Baker, 609 F. 2D at 139. The same is true for conspiracy and inconvenience. If so, conspiracy and incitement are more closely related to the death penalty. In short, the court cannot find a legitimate jurisdiction that distinguishes conspiracy and inconvenience and assistance from the crimes related to this proposal.

The question of whether the RICO and travel laws are subject to litigation abroad is more complicated. There is no reference to this issue in the precedents mentioned to the parties, and the court does not know a case where this problem is considered. [6] Therefore, the issues related to the application of these laws outdoors are clearly first impressions. For the following reasons, the court is Rico, Rico, Article 18 of the United States Code Article 1962 (C) and (D), and Travel Law Article 18 (A) (3) (A) (3). It is judged to be applied to. Regarding Article 952 of the United States 21, it is clear from the nature of crime that this law intended to act outside the region. Article 952 prohibits the import of drugs from abroad to the United States. (By the author). In the definition of imports, the court can conclude that ง 952 applies to acts starting abroad, as it means act performed outside the US territorial boundaries. The US vs kaden case, 585 F. 2D AT 1259. Since the jurisdiction of the substantive crime ง 959 and 952 has been established, there is also jurisdiction over conspiracy and accomplishments and incomplete. Because the crime conspiracy is closely related to the crime itself, the court regularly concludes based on the conclusion that substantial legal standards are applied in foreign countries regarding the ง 963 conspiracy. I am. For example, CHUA KHAN MOU V. UNITED STATES, 730 F. 2D 1308, 1311 (9th CIR. 1984), Certificate Denied, 470 U. S. 1031, 105 S. CT. nited States v. Baker, 609 F. 2D at 139. The same is true for conspiracy and inconvenience. If so, conspiracy and incitement are more closely related to the death penalty. In short, the court cannot find a legitimate jurisdiction that distinguishes conspiracy and inconvenience and assistance from the crimes related to this proposal.

The question of whether the RICO and travel laws are subject to litigation abroad is more complicated. There is no reference to this issue in the precedents mentioned to the parties, and the court does not know a case where this problem is considered. [6] Therefore, the issues related to the application of these laws outdoors are clearly first impressions. For the following reasons, the court is Rico, Rico, Article 18 of the United States Code Article 1962 (C) and (D), and Travel Law Article 18 (A) (3) (A) (3). It is judged to be applied to. Regarding Article 952 of the United States 21, it is clear from the nature of crime that this law intended to act outside the region. Article 952 prohibits the import of drugs from abroad to the United States. (By the author). In the definition of imports, the court can conclude that ง 952 applies to acts starting abroad, as it means act performed outside the US territorial boundaries. The US vs kaden case, 585 F. 2D AT 1259. Since the jurisdiction of the substantive crime ง 959 and 952 has been established, there is also jurisdiction over conspiracy and accomplishments and incomplete. Because the crime conspiracy is closely related to the crime itself, the court regularly concludes based on the conclusion that substantial legal standards are applied in foreign countries regarding the ง 963 conspiracy. I am. For example, CHUA KHAN MOU V. UNITED STATES, 730 F. 2D 1308, 1311 (9th CIR. 1984), Certificate Denied, 470 U. S. 1031, 105 S. CT. nited States v. Baker, 609 F. 2D at 139. The same is true for conspiracy and inconvenience. If so, conspiracy and incitement are more closely related to the death penalty. In short, the court cannot find a legitimate jurisdiction that distinguishes conspiracy and inconvenience and assistance from the crimes related to this proposal.

Article 1962 (c) prohibits "a company involved or participating in business activities of the company that is engaged in stat e-t o-state trade or foreign trade or affects its activities". I'm doing it. To participate in or participate in business activities of such a company through compulsory activities. "18 USC ง 1962 (c) (emphasis). Article 1962 (D), similarly," person who deals with violations "is illegal. Article 1962 (C). 18 USC ง 1962 (D) (emphasis). These prohibited matters are regarded as universal, and there is no hig h-specific application. If there is a widely applied law, it is RICO. [7]

The federal parliament brought RICO because of the first interest in sanctions to eradicate the destructive impact on our conversation:

(1) Sanctions in the United States have inhaled billions of dollars every year from the US economy. (3) These resources and governance are becoming increasingly used for the penetration and corruption of legal companies and unions, weakening and corruption of democratic processes. (4) The operation of sanctions in the United States reduces the strength of the national financial system, harms innocent merchants and competitions, hinders free competition, and significantly hinders stat e-o f-state and foreign trade. And the general welfare of the people is impaired.

RICO's findings and target statements, Pub. Rico StateMent of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84st. & Amp; amp; amp; However, the responsibility in this law is based on financial results. RICO itself is not so limited. This situation shows concerns about Japan's domestic security and prosperity as well as general production. Marcos III, 862 F. 2D at 1366 (SCHROEDER, district arbitrator, some agreement, partly opposition).

The statements of findings and the purpose of the company describe the criminal act of "USA", but in court, it must take into account the overall purpose of the law and how much the parliament hoped for its influence. There is no doubt that the legislative record should have been widely interpreted by RICO as a means of fighting unprecedented sanctions. What is the parliament, what and what:

A new layout is needed here, targeting not only individuals but also the financial foundations on which these people pose a grave danger to the financial prosperity of civilization. In short, it is necessary to attack the keys to their financial authority, and at the same time, on all easily accessible fronts.

S. S. Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969) (italics added). Only in this spirit of attacking the crime "from all sides" should all the provisions of this law be read. Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 498, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286, 87 L. ed. 2d 346 (1985). Congress deliberately warned that "RICO will step in to speak generously for the merits of the purpose of remedying the situation" [8], and to this end, RICO deliberately broadened and determined the distance of the following formulation: 7th District:

[I]n RICO, we meet the law. Before that, deliberately, very broadly.

By defining the law's main definitions of "person," "corporation," and "racket," and leaving the broad definitions of "conduct" and "participation" uncertain, Congress deliberately decided to apply a broad definition that is not subject to judicial restriction. Congress [decided] to apply a broad formulation to these anomalies, judging the merits of the desired goal. As for suggestions on how to narrowly register the law to prevent accidental use, Congress clearly preferred breadth of precision.

Haroco Inc. Opposite American National Bank & amp; amp; amp;; Trust Co, 747 F. 2d at 398.

Given the broad interpretation of the Act and its equally broad purpose of eliminating the scourge of organized crime, it is clear that Congress was concerned with the results of racketeering activities rather than their location. The Act therefore does not permit the inference that it was intended to apply only to activities within the United States. Such a narrow interpretation would undermine the purpose of RICO by allowing individuals involved in racketeering activities aimed at the United States to avoid RICO prosecution simply by moving their activities overseas. In the context of drug activity, perhaps the greatest threat to the nation's prosperity comes from activities outside the United States, such as the Colombian cocaine cartels. Given Congress' specific direction to liberally apply RICO to achieve its remedial purpose, the mere fact that RICO is extraterritorial in nature does not preclude RICO from applying to such harmful activities. As long as racketeering activities have or may have domestic consequences, RICO applies. Noriega is also charged with violating the Travel Act (18 U. S. C. 1952(a)(3)) by arranging foreign travel and using instruments of foreign and interstate commerce to further illegal activities. The indictment alleges that Noriega's associates twice used airplanes to transport drug proceeds from Miami to Panama.

*1518 Like RICO, the Travel Act was initially developed to combat licensed crime. Specifically, "The purpose of the Travel Act was to assist district law enforcement agencies. In many cases the 'chiefs' of such or other criminal communities resided in one state but organized their illegal activities in another. Restricting the movement of information vital to these activities would shape Federal attention and control criminal activities that proved to be irritating to district authorities. United States v. Nardello, 393 U. S. 286, 290, 89 S. Ct. 534, 536, 21 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1969). Thus, the Act provided a call for Federal assistance in an attempt to control criminal activity unique in its scope and evolution over time, i. e., one whose effects crossed state and state lines and were therefore disruptive." S. Rep. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1961). However, while the court mentioned "residing in the same state" as a higher provision, the law itself does not indicate any territorial limitations on this. As a result, the link is more accurately seen as an appeal of interest to interstate institutions, not the location of the defendant. More expansively, the law is an "attempt to exclude access to the routes of commerce from those operating with criminal intent." Earlenbaugh v. United States

In the case provided, the defendant supposedly joined a crime syndicate that used trafficking routes to materialize illegal drug sales in the United States. Although his place of residence has the ability to be distinguished from the place of residence of a normal defendant under the travel law, the disposition and consequences of the authorized work are the same, and this has the desire of Congress to seize acts that go beyond the limits in the same way as with a physical level, for example, a suspended sentence.

The wording of the law supporting the extraterritorial use of Section 1952(a)(3) means that it is not limited by the space of the act, but in practice, it does not consider that it leads to exceeding the limits of the state.

The language of Section 1952 is considered conventional and does not include restrictions on specific persons or specific appearances of cruelty related to gambling, alcohol, drugs, or prostitution.

[The Federal Congress was exactly what Article 1952 stated, "he intentionally, all of those who engage in illegal business in any of the four activities specified by the law. In general, the law was generally applied without restrictions.

The United States vs. Roseli Case, 432 F. 2D 879, 885 (9th CIR. 1970), Cert. 924, 91 S. CT. 883, 27 L. ED. 2D 828 (1971). It was related to the use of travel law for criminal acts, regardless of the fact that the defendant was not involved in the classic sanctions, but the free range of the law. Consideration of places seems to be applied here as well. [10] In short, the judge is located in the United States at a physical level when the defendant travels or work over the state to pursue illegal purposes, as in this case. Regardless of whether or not it is, 1952 (a) (3) is applied.

Therefore, the precedents for the defendant's no n-regional acts are considered as follows, for example, from the viewpoint of international law and the interpretation of the law.

II.

Next, he appreciates Noriega's claim that Noriega has enjoyed the exemption of national leaders, the theory of the local government law, and a diplomat exemption.

A. Exemption from national leaders

Based on simple international law, the national leaders of the national leaders are the top of the country, at least for the ideal public act while the rulers are staying in the country, the right of foreign courts. I don't wear it. In relation to the large jury, DOE #700, 817 F. 2D 1108, 1110 (4th CIR.), Cert. 890, 108 S. CT. 212, 98 L. ED. 2D 176 (1987) , 860 F. 2D 40, 44-45 (2D CIR. 1988). The theoretical basis of this theory is that the leader can smoothly carry out the duties of their own government without being restrained, arrested, or confused in foreign legal systems It is to promote respect. [11] Related to the procedure, DOE #700, 817 F. 2D at 1110; General Note, the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity; Rev. 169, 171 Se e-79 (1986).

To declare the exemption of the state head, civil servants must be approved as the head of the state. Noriga has never been approved in the Panama Constitution or the United States as the head of Panama. The Panama Constitution, Chapter 6, 170, stipulates an administrative department consisting of the President and the Minister of State, and Noriega does not apply to one of these functions. Officially, Noriega was the commander of the Panama Defense Force [12], but has never been selected as the top of the Panama government and abolished Panama's presidential election on May 7, 1989. More importantly, the US government did not recognize the status of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state, and continued to approve President Eric Altoulo Delbal as Panama as a legitimate leader of Panama while Norieg was grasped. Just as the court ruled in the previous Panama Republic, the decision of the administrative government to recognize President Delbal as the head of Panama is essential in the trial. Panama Republic vs. Air Panama, 745 F. Supp. 669 (S. D. Fla. 1988). The ruling of this case cannot be found in this case, but based on many precedent judgments, and the approval of foreign governments and their leaders is the discretionary diplomacy adopted by the defendant. It is a policy decision. To declare the exemption of the state of the state, civil servants must be approved as the head of the state. Noriga has never been approved in the Panama Constitution or the United States as the head of Panama. The Panama Constitution, Chapter 6, 170, stipulates an administrative department consisting of the President and the Minister of State, and Noriega does not apply to one of these functions. Officially, Noriega was the commander of the Panama Defense Force [12], but has never been selected as the top of the Panama government and abolished Panama's presidential election on May 7, 1989. More importantly, the US government did not recognize the status of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state, and continued to approve President Eric Altoulo Delbal as Panama as a legitimate leader of Panama while Norieg was grasped. Just as the court ruled in the previous Panama Republic, the decision of the administrative government to recognize President Delbal as the head of Panama is essential in the trial. Panama Republic vs. Air Panama, 745 F. Supp. 669 (S. D. Fla. 1988). The ruling of this case cannot be found in this case, but based on many precedent judgments, and the approval of foreign governments and their leaders is the discretionary diplomacy adopted by the defendant. It is a policy decision. To declare the exemption of the state head, civil servants must be approved as the head of the state. Noriga has never been approved in the Panama Constitution or the United States as the head of Panama. The Panama Constitution, Chapter 6, 170, stipulates an administrative department consisting of the President and the Minister of State, and Noriega does not apply to one of these functions. Officially, Noriega was the commander of the Panama Defense Force [12], but has never been selected as the top of the Panama government and abolished Panama's presidential election on May 7, 1989. More importantly, the US government did not recognize the status of the state of the state of the state of the state of the state, and continued to approve President Eric Altoulo Delbal as Panama as a legitimate leader of Panama while Norieg was grasped. Just as the court ruled in the previous Panama Republic, the decision of the administrative government to recognize President Delbal as the head of Panama is essential in the trial. Panama Republic vs. Air Panama, 745 F. Supp. 669 (S. D. Fla. 1988). The ruling of this case cannot be found in this case, but it is based on many precedents, and the approval of foreign governments and their leaders is the discretionary diplomacy adopted by the defendant. It is a policy decision.

In addition, neither Panama nor the United States actually recognizes Noriega as the country's leader, and the defendants acknowledge that they do not actually fit the classical notion of a head of state as assigned by simple international law. [13] Most importantly, the defendants declare that international law includes the rights of a non-contractual leader of a country, as the de facto ruler of Panama, "regardless of the source of power or disposition of control." The defendants refer to numerous newspaper reports and excerpts from congressional testimony that Noriega was in near control of Panama. In fact, this Court has previously, deaf to Delval's public admission, found that Noriega was the actual head of the Panamanian government. United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. Op. 1374, N. 3. However, the fact that Noriega actually ruled Panama does not mean that he actually included the right to the immunity of the country's leader, since the transfer of immunity is a benefit that the United States has every opportunity to bequeath to any candidate. [14] The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L. ed. 287 (1812); Note, Defined Right of Kings, supra at 188 (the "head of state" is required to be defined as a political or ceremonial head of government recognized by the United States.

The "head of state" argument was made by the Court without evidence and was based mainly on general information disseminated by the media. However, if we assume that the statements made by the lawyers regarding the dominant position of the accused are true, the argument that immunity from prosecution should be granted "regardless of the source of power or the nature of control" would allow illegitimate dictators to enjoy the benefits of their principled and cruel seizure of power.*1521 Such a groundbreaking expansion of head of state immunity is without merit and the Court refuses to create it in this case. Since the United States does not recognize General Noriag as the Head of State of the State of Panama, he has no right to claim head of state immunity.

B. The Law of Nations Principle

Noriega further argues that the law of nations principle prohibits the Court from reviewing the lawfulness of official acts in Panama. Unlike the immunity of heads of state, the law of nations principle does not raise a question of jurisdiction and does not affect the Court's review of specific government acts. It is correct to understand the immunity as a means of excluding the issue, rather than as a prohibition on prosecution. Restatement (third) ง 443, Reporters' Note 11. See also National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 n. 30 (S. D. N. Y. 1978) (sovereign immunity to state law doctrine), aff'd, 597 F. 2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). The "sovereign immunity to state law doctrine" was asserted by the Court without evidence and based mainly on general information disseminated by the media. However, assuming that the statements made by the lawyers about the dominant position of the defendants are true, the argument that immunity from prosecution should be granted "regardless of the source of power or the nature of control" allows illegitimate dictators to enjoy the benefits of their principled and brutal seizure of power.*1521 Such a monumental expansion of sovereign immunity is without merit, and the Court declines to create it in this case. The United States does not recognize General Noriag as the head of state of the State of Panama, and therefore has no right to assert sovereign immunity.

B. State Law Doctrine

Noriega further argues that state law doctrine prohibits the Court from reviewing the legality of official acts in Panama. Unlike state law immunity, state law doctrine does not raise jurisdictional questions and does not affect the Court's review of specific government acts. It is best understood as a means of excluding issues, not immunity from prosecution. Restatement (third) ง 443, Reporters' Note 11. See also National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 n. 30 (S. D. N. Y. 1978) (sovereign immunity to state law doctrine), aff'd, 597 F. 2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). The "head of state" argument was made by the Court without evidence and was based mainly on general information disseminated by the media. However, if we assume that the statements made by the lawyers regarding the dominant position of the accused are true, the argument that immunity from prosecution should be granted "regardless of the source of power or the nature of control" would allow illegitimate dictators to enjoy the benefits of their principled and cruel seizure of power.*1521 Such a groundbreaking expansion of head of state immunity is without merit and the Court refuses to create it in this case. Since the United States does not recognize General Noriag as the Head of State of the State of Panama, he has no right to claim head of state immunity.

B. The Law of Nations Principle

Noriega further argues that the law of nations principle prohibits the Court from reviewing the lawfulness of official acts in Panama. Unlike the immunity of heads of state, the law of nations principle does not raise a question of jurisdiction and does not affect the Court's review of specific government acts. It is correct to understand the immunity as a means of excluding the issue, rather than as a prohibition on prosecution. Restatement (third) ง 443, Reporters' Note 11. See also National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640 n. 30 (S. D. N. Y. 1978) (sovereign immunity to state law doctrine), aff'd, 597 F. 2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).

The classic expression of this doctrine lies in underhill vs Hernandes. "All sovereigns are obliged to respect all other sovereign nations, and some national courts do not judge the actions of other governments in their own territory." 168 U. S. 250, 252, 18 S. CT. 83, 84, 42 L. EXH. 456 (1897). More than 60 years later, the Supreme Court Compensation for Cuba n-owned property foreclosure in Cub a-owned Cuban government. This principle was reconfirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, which refused to consider without payment of. 376 U. S. 398, 84 S. CT. 923, 11 L. ED. 2D 804 (1964). Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. SuPP. Rine Law Barred COURT from Reviewing Refusal to Allow Husband to the UNITED STES), 761 F. 370 (7th Cir.) 1985); Banco de España v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2D AT 443 Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) Is a law that hinders the court to judge publicly). The classic expression of this doctrine lies in Underhill vs Hernandes. "All sovereigns are obliged to respect all other sovereign nations, and some national courts do not judge the actions of other governments in their own territory." 168 U. S. 250, 252, 18 S. CT. 83, 84, 42 L. EXH. 456 (1897). More than 60 years later, the Supreme Court Compensation for Cuba n-owned property foreclosure in Cub a-owned Cuban government. This principle was reconfirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, which refused to consider without payment of. 376 U. S. 398, 84 S. CT. 923, 11 L. ED. 2D 804 (1964). Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. SuPP. Rine Law Barred COURT from Reviewing Refusal to Allow Husband to the UNITED STES), 761 F. 370 (7th Cir.) 1985); Banco de España v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2D AT 443 Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) Is a law that hinders the court to judge publicly). The classic expression of this doctrine lies in underhill vs Hernandes. "All sovereigns are obliged to respect all other sovereign nations, and some national courts do not judge the actions of other governments in their own territory." 168 U. S. 250, 252, 18 S. CT. 83, 84, 42 L. EXH. 456 (1897). More than 60 years later, the Supreme Court Compensation for Cuba n-owned property foreclosure in Cub a-owned Cuban government. This principle was reconfirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, which refused to consider without payment of. 376 U. S. 398, 84 S. CT. 923, 11 L. ED. 2D 804 (1964). Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. SuPP. Rine Law Barred COURT from Reviewing Refusal to Allow Husband to the UNITED STES), 761 F. 370 (7th Cir.) 1985); Banco de España v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2D at 443 (COURT COURT 443 Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) Is a law that hinders the court to judge publicly).

Without paying attention to the fact that the theory actually expresses the influence of the "state" or "sovereign," it extends to government acts by state officials in a sovereign capacity. Bernstein v. Van Hagen Freres, S. A., 163 F. 2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 772, 68 S. Ct. 88, 92 L. Ed. 357 (1947); Banco de España v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2d at 444. It is unclear whether these officials or their governments should be accepted or "accepted." The Underhill court, supra, held that the theory of municipal acts "cannot be limited to lawful or generally accepted governments." The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign courts for unquestionable effects within the personal sphere of the state in the exercise of government power, whether civil servants or military commanders, must necessarily extend to agents of sovereign governments. "Fact." 168 U. S. at 252, 18 S. Ct. at 84. But Sabatino points out the opposite. "The administration of justice does not consider the validity of a seizure of private property on land by a sovereign foreign government existing at the time the claim is made and recognized by the state. " 376 U. S. at 428, 84 S. Ct. at 940 (nadru

For state law principles to apply, a defendant must prove that the act was an "act of the State," that is, performed on behalf of the State and not the actor's own private act. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U. S. 682, 694, 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1861, 48 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1976). "The fact that acts must be public and sovereign has been repeatedly affirmed." Marcos I, 806 F. 2d at 358 (marked in original). Although it may be difficult to distinguish between the public and private acts of public officials, this difficulty does not prevent a court from carefully considering the nature of the act under consideration. That is correct. Op 359 (distinguishing between the acts of overthrown Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos as head of state and his purely private actions); Dunhill, 425 U. S. Op 695, 96 S. Ct. at 1862 (commercial activities are not acts of state); Sharon v. Time, Inc, 599 F. Supp. 538, 544-45 (S. D. N. Y. 1984) (Defense Minister's alleged support of genocide was not the policy of the Israeli government and therefore not an act of state); De Roburt v. Gannett Co, 733 F. 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1984) (doctrine of State law is not apply to the private, unofficial actions of a foreign ruler), certificate rejected, 469 U. S. 1159, 105 S. Ct. 909, 83 L. ed. 2d. 2d

The court does not understand why Noriegi's drug trafficking and money laundering can be a public act on behalf of Panama. Of course, despite the defendant's liability for this issue, no evidence of this problem was submitted. Dunhill, 425 U. S. at 694, 96 S. CT. 1861. The indictment of the case contains many private acts that the defendant did to get personal financial wealth. It has not been approved that Noriega has participated in Panama's national policy or for some supreme national interests and has been conspiring to conspiracy over cocaine imports to the United States. I can't. The fact that Noriega has participated in criminal acts using its public status is not public, as suggested by the defendant. As is well known, civil servants, like the state, can use their public status for personal and selfish purposes. The problem is whether Noriei used the public status to perform the dispute act, but whether these acts were performed for Noriegi, not Panama. The

The defendant only claims that Panama's de facto ruler is a government act. This distant position is completely ignored the distinction between public and private sector, and that public leaders cannot be involved in private unofficial acts. Aside from the lack of logic, it goes without saying that this debate has been implicitly denied in some cases that distinguish between the private and public behavior of the head of state and foreign dictators. Marcos I, 806 F. 2D at 359; Marcos III, 862 F. 2D at 1361; de Roburt v. Gannett Co, 733 F. 2D at 704; Jimenez, 311 F. 2D AT 557-58. The belief that Noriega as a dictator is essentially sovereign, and that all his actions are all national acts are the most inconsistent precedent, the Himenes case (above), which is a directly inconsistent case (above). It is fundamentally damaged. In this case, the Republic of Venezuela claimed that Himez, a former president and dictator, had committed a financial crime for private interests using his position. "The dictator," he himself is the sovereign of the Venezuela government, and all acts equivalent to the financial crime he are accusing is a national or sovereign act. "Page 557. The 5th round ward was judged:

The appellant was a dictator, but he himself was not the government of Venezuela, the government of the national doctrine. He was the president and official of the sovereign state called Venezuela. The law of national acts is applied only when officials who exercise sovereignty act on public qualifications.

The act of the appellant who constitutes financial crimes is not based on Venezuela's sovereignty. [All of these acts were performed for the appellant for personal economic interests. These acts are the normal crimes that the head of the state violated in violation of their job, not for the execution of their responsibilities. Like rape, it is far from national acts. The defendant only claims that Panama's de facto ruler is a government act. This distant position is completely ignored the distinction between public and private sector, and that public leaders cannot be involved in private unofficial acts. Aside from the lack of logic, it goes without saying that this debate has been implicitly denied in some cases that distinguish between the private and public behavior of the head of state and foreign dictators. Marcos I, 806 F. 2D at 359; Marcos III, 862 F. 2D at 1361; de Roburt v. Gannett Co, 733 F. 2D at 704; Jimenez, 311 F. 2D AT 557-58. The belief that Noriega as a dictator is essentially sovereign, and that all his actions are all national acts are the most inconsistent precedent, the Himenes case (above), which is a directly inconsistent case (above). It is fundamentally damaged. In this case, the Republic of Venezuela claimed that Himez, a former president and dictator, had committed a financial crime for private interests using his position. "The dictator," he himself is the sovereign of the Venezuela government, and all acts equivalent to the financial crime he are accusing is a national or sovereign act. "Page 557. The 5th round ward was judged:

The appellant was a dictator, but he himself was not the government of Venezuela, the government of the national doctrine. He was the president and official of the sovereign state called Venezuela. The law of national acts is applied only when officials who exercise sovereignty act on public qualifications.

The act of the appellant who constitutes financial crimes is not based on Venezuela's sovereignty. [All of these acts were performed for the appellant for personal economic interests. These acts are the normal crimes that the head of the state violated in violation of their job, not for the execution of their responsibilities. Like rape, it is far from national acts. The defendant only claims that Panama's de facto ruler is a government act. This distant position is completely ignored the distinction between public and private sector, and that public leaders cannot be involved in private unofficial acts. Aside from the lack of logic, it goes without saying that this debate has been implicitly denied in some cases that distinguish between the private and public behavior of the head of state and foreign dictators. Marcos I, 806 F. 2D at 359; Marcos III, 862 F. 2D at 1361; de Roburt v. Gannett Co, 733 F. 2D at 704; Jimenez, 311 F. 2D AT 557-58. The belief that Noriega as a dictator is essentially sovereign, and that all his actions are all national acts are the most inconsistent precedent, the Himenes case (above), which is a directly inconsistent case (above). It is fundamentally damaged. In this case, the Republic of Venezuela claimed that Himez, a former president and dictator, had committed a financial crime for private interests using his position. Himenes argued, "The dictator is the sovereign of the Venezuela government, and all acts equivalent to the financial crime he are accused are national or sovereign. "Page 557. The 5th round area was determined:

The appellant was a dictator, but he himself was not the government of Venezuela, the government of the national doctrine. He was the president and official of the sovereign state called Venezuela. The law of national acts is applied only when officials who exercise sovereignty act on public qualifications.

The act of the appellant who constitutes financial crimes is not based on Venezuela's sovereignty. [All of these acts were performed for the appellant for personal economic interests. These acts are the normal crimes that the head of the state violated in violation of their job, not for the execution of their job. Like rape, it is far from national acts.

There are no fundamental differences in fact that distinguish this case from Jimenez. The Ninth District's conclusions regarding Marcos II's occupation, on which appellee relies primarily, have not yet been upheld by the Tribunal. In that case, the Court effectively held that the alleged theft and conversion by deposed tyrant Ferdinand Marcos of property and funds belonging to the Republic of the Philippines constituted community action because "it was an act which Marcos could have performed only pursuant to his personal powers as President." 818 F. 2d at 1479. In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Arbitrator Nelson persuasively argued that the majority's opinion effectively nullified the distinction between municipal and private entities and afforded unconditional protection to all acts of Marcos during his reign. On en banc review (following defense briefs), the Ninth Circuit set aside this nuance of its conclusion and essentially accepted Nelson's argument, concluding, in effect, that Marcos had not established that the alleged theft was a municipal act. The Court stated, "Our courts have no difficulty in distinguishing between the lawful influence of a deposed ruler and self-interested acts without lawful basis." Marcos III, 862 F. 2d at 1361. Thus, there is no precedent in this area in Marcos II. There are no fundamental differences in fact that distinguish this case from Jimenez. The Ninth District's conclusions regarding Marcos II's occupation, on which appellee relies primarily, have not been upheld by the Tribunal. In this case, the Court effectively held that the alleged theft and conversion of property and funds belonging to the Republic of the Philippines by deposed tyrant Ferdinand Marcos constituted communal conduct because "these were acts which Marcos could only have performed pursuant to his own presidential authority." 818 F. 2d at 1479. In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Arbitrator Nelson persuasively argued that the majority opinion effectively nullified the municipal/private agency distinction and provided unconditional protection for all acts of Marcos during his reign. On en banc review (held after defense briefs), the Ninth Circuit set aside this nuance in its conclusion and essentially accepted Nelson's argument, concluding, in effect, that Marcos had not established that the alleged thefts were communal conduct. The Court stated that "our Courts have no difficulty in distinguishing between the legitimate influence of a deposed ruler and his self-interested acts without a lawful basis." Marcos III, 862 F. 2d at 1361. Thus, there is no precedent in this area in Marcos II. There are in fact no fundamental differences that distinguish this case from Jimenez. The Ninth District's conclusions regarding Marcos II's occupation, on which appellee relies primarily, have not yet been upheld by the Tribunal. In that case, the Court effectively held that the alleged theft and conversion by deposed tyrant Ferdinand Marcos of property and funds belonging to the Republic of the Philippines constituted community action because "it was an act which Marcos could have performed only pursuant to his personal powers as President." 818 F. 2d at 1479. In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Arbitrator Nelson persuasively argued that the majority opinion in effect nullified the distinction between municipal and private entities and provided unconditional protection for all acts of Marcos during his reign. On en banc review (following defense briefs), the Ninth Circuit set aside this nuance in its conclusion and essentially accepted Nelson's argument, concluding, in effect, that Marcos had not established that the alleged theft was a municipal act. The Court stated, "Our courts have no difficulty distinguishing between the legitimate influence of a deposed ruler and self-interested acts without a lawful basis." Marcos III, 862 F. 2d at 1361. Thus, there is no precedent in this area in Marcos II.

There are also voices opposed to the use of the doctrine of autonomous acts in this course. However, this doctrine was initially formulated in the definition of sovereign immunity and, in its modern form, is not based on the principles of international law or on respect for the independence of sovereigns. Recent interpretations of this doctrine instead emphasize the rationale of the separation of powers, i. e. the need to prevent judicial interference in the sphere of foreign policy and international diplomacy. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. C. at 421-23, 84 S. Ct. at 936-37; In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F. 2d at 831; International Ass'n of Machinists & amp; amp; Aviation Workers v. OPEC, 649 F. 2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. ), cert. 1163, 102 S. Ct. 1036, 71 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1982), cert denied, 454 U. S., 102 S. Ct. "By establishing the legality of acts from abroad, the judiciary has every opportunity to interfere with the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, and the need to play its only front on the global stage. In the present case, there is no such threat.

C. Diplomatic Immunity

Noriega accepted from the beginning that his application for diplomatic status did not fall within the framework of the two laws governing diplomatic privileges and immunities, the Diplomatic Relations Act[15] and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations[16]. The Panamanian government never requested that Noriega be recognized as a diplomat, and the United States never granted him such status, as expressly provided in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention. [17] Noriega never met the Department of Citizenship's criteria for recognition, which specifically require that he reside in the Washington area and engage in diplomatic service substantially on a permanent basis. [18] As the defendant himself said, "diplomatic privileges generally apply to persons with privileges who are in the territory of the United States." [19] In this case, Noriega was not granted diplomatic privileges and was not stationed as a diplomat.

Noriga Acquiring diplomatic status In light of the simple claims, he actually traveled to Panama's diplomatic passport and received a "A-2" visa from the US USA. Based on it. Previously, the issuance of Panama's diplomatic passport is considered to be a problem of most Panama's law and does not affect the owner's status in another state. However, the diplomatic passport issued by Panama provides defendant, the surveillance signal has the ability to guarantee a specific etiquette international trip, they do not have the meaning of international law and the United States. , Rights for any status under international or domestic defense. "In principle, the government sends a diplomat's personal passport to diplomat in its own country, and the government accepted him a diplomatic visa, but these passports and visas are not diplomats and other people. It does not prove that the owner actually uses the diplomat's status or contains diplomatic privileges and exemption rights to the national acceptance. 1 (UNITED STES V. ARIZTI, 229 F. Supp. Predecessor It is not considered a notification or desire, and even if you imagine that it is actually so, it does not include any power.

A-2 visas do not yet show important diplomatic privileges. The issuance of a US visa is deemed to be an administrative impact related to the US Immigration Law, and has nothing to do with diploma t-certified processes. In October 1985, the Ministry of Municipalities called on diplomatic documents that they did not meet the simple claims to acquire Noriga diplomatic status. In light, he is based on a key that has actually traveled to Panama's diplomatic passport and received a "A-2" visa from the US USA. Previously, the issuance of Panama's diplomatic passport is considered to be a problem of most Panama's law and does not affect the owner's status in another state. However, the diplomatic passport issued by Panama provides defendant, the surveillance signal has the ability to guarantee a specific etiquette international trip, they do not have the meaning of international law and the United States. , Rights for any status under international or domestic defense. "In principle, the government sends a diplomat's personal passport to diplomat in its own country, and the government accepted him a diplomatic visa, but these passports and visas are not diplomats and other people. It does not prove that the owner actually uses the diplomat's status or contains diplomatic privileges and exemption rights to the national acceptance. 1 (UNITED STES V. ARIZTI, 229 F. Supp. Predecessor It is not considered a notification or desire, and even if you imagine that it is actually so, it does not include any power.

A-2 visas do not yet show important diplomatic privileges. The issuance of a US visa is deemed to be an administrative impact related to the US Immigration Law, and has nothing to do with diploma t-certified processes. In October 1985, the Ministry of Municipalities called on diplomatic documents to all diplomatic representatives in the United States as follows: NORIGA Acquisition of diplomatic status, in light of the simple claims. He is based on a key that has actually traveled to Panama's diplomatic passport and received a "A-2" visa from the US USA. Previously, the issuance of Panama's diplomatic passport is considered to be mostly a problem for Panama's law and does not affect the owner's status in another state. However, the diplomatic passport issued by Panama provides defendant, the surveillance signal has the ability to guarantee a specific etiquette international trip, they do not have the meaning of international law and the United States. , Rights for any status under international or domestic defense. "In principle, the government sends a diplomat's personal passport to diplomat in its own country, and the government accepted him a diplomatic visa, but these passports and visas are not diplomats and other people. It does not prove that the owner actually uses the diplomat's status or contains diplomatic privileges and exemption rights to the national acceptance. 1 (UNITED STES V. ARIZTI, 229 F. Supp. Predecessor It is not considered a notification or desire, and even if you imagine that it is actually so, it does not include any power.

A-2 visas do not yet show important diplomatic privileges. The issuance of a US visa is deemed to be an administrative impact on the US Immigration Law, and has nothing to do with diploma t-certified processes. In October 1985, the Ministry of Municipal calls in diplomacy as follows: all diplomatic representatives in the United States:

"Under U. S. law, the issuance of a visa is a process to control entry into and visits to the United States.* Under the current Category A visa regulations, thousands of people are issued each year, many of whom do not engage in diplomatic or consular business in the United States. 4 They have consular status in the United States and are therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities accorded to persons with diplomatic or consular status." [20]

In other words, the mere possession of an "A-2" visa does not confer diplomatic immunity. United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F. 2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), Certificate denied, 469 U. S. 881, 105 S. Ct. 246, 83 L. ed. 2d 184 (1984); The United States v Aristi, 229 F. Supp. at 54-55; The United States v. Koplon, 88 F. Supp. at 920. For example, defendant has not presented evidence that the United States Government accepted him as a member of the Panamanian diplomatic corps, issued him a diplomatic identity card, or placed him on the official diplomatic list. In the absence of such evidence of diplomatic status, the A-2 visa is clearly insufficient. Defendant's claim of diplomatic immunity must therefore be denied. III. Defendants' Prisoner-of-War Status Defendants Noria and Del Cid claim to be prisoners of war ("POWs") within the meaning of the Geneva Convention on Prisoner-of-War Appeals (Geneva III),[21] which, according to Defendants, deprives the Court of jurisdiction to try this action. On the first application of the motion, the Government does not argue that the Defendants are not prisoners of war, but rather that the Geneva Convention would not deprive the Court of jurisdiction even if the Defendants were prisoners of war. Thus, the Court need not determine whether the Defendants are prisoners of war under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, but will consider the claims as if the Defendants were entitled to the full defense provided by that Convention.[22] Defendants' Geneva Convention claims are based on Articles 82, 84, 85, 87, 99, and 22, each of which is considered below.

X. Article 82

Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws and orders in force in their own armed forces, and that country shall have the right to take judicial or disciplinary measures for any offences committed by prisoners of war against those laws or orders. However, no procedure or sanction contrary to the provisions of this chapter shall be permitted. 2. Whereas acts committed by prisoners of war are not punishable if they were committed by members of the armed forces of the capturing State, acts committed by prisoners of war which the laws or orders of the capturing State make criminal offences shall be subject to disciplinary measures. Only fines.

As is clear from the text, Article 82 covers disciplinary and criminal prosecutions for offences committed after capture, and prisoners of war may only be prosecuted for offences punishable in relation to members of the armed forces in their custody. It is therefore clear that Article 82 does not apply to the present case, since Noriega and Del Cid are prosecuted for offences committed long before their capture, and not after their capture.

X. Article 84

1. Prisoners of war may be tried only by military courts, unless the existing laws of the receiving country expressly permit civilian courts to try members of the receiving country for the particular crimes allegedly committed by the prisoners.

2. Prisoners of war may not in any case be tried by a court of law that does not provide the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality generally recognized, and in particular, whose proceedings do not provide the rights and remedies of the accused set forth in Article 105.

Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 3231, federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with military courts for all violations of United States law committed by military personnel. [23] Indictment *1526 charges the defendants with various federal offenses, including drug trafficking, RICO offenses, and RICO conspiracy, which are criminal offenses that may be indicted against any member of the United States armed forces. Therefore, the prohibition in Article 84, paragraph 1, does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction.

The lawyer does not claim that the court does not provide an important guarantee of independence and fairness. "The defendant does not claim that the complete rights stipulated in Article 105 will not be given. These rights include prior notice of lawyer agency and complaint. See 6 U. S. T. OP 3396. In fact, the defendant will use all the constitutional security given to those who have been charged with the federal crime.

X. Article 85

1. POWs shall maintain the interests of this treaty, even in the event that they are accused of the acts performed before the capture of POWs, in accordance with the national laws and regulations that provide the army.

This article does not affirm the general position of the accused accused in accordance with the Geneva Treaty, but has acknowledged the right of prosecution by the government. This article describes "POWs pursued in accordance with the laws of the ownership" (that is, the United States), and the acts that were "performed before sequence." In addition, POWs will receive the benefits of the treaty, "even if they are guilty." In the indictment, the defendant was accused of violating the United States Law,

X. Article 87

1. POWs cannot be punished by military authorities and courts in the country where prisoners are detained, except for penalties specified by military soldiers of the country who performed the same act.

Article 82 reflects the principle of "equality", which is embodied in other articles of the Treaty. This principle stipulates that war POWs can be prosecuted for criminal acts only when soldiers in the army have the same prosecution for the same act. With the specific application of Article 87's "equivalent" principles, no punishment for military soldiers for the same act will not be applied to POWs. Assuming that the defendants are convicted of one or more crimes accused, they are less than punishments applied to US soldiers who have been convicted of the same crime. I do not face. Therefore, such criminal punishments match the provisions of Article 87.

X. Article 99 The lawyer does not claim that the court does not provide an important guarantee of independence and fairness. "The defendant does not claim that the complete rights stipulated in Article 105 will not be given. These rights include prior notice of lawyer agency and complaint. See 6 U. S. T. OP 3396. In fact, the defendant will use all the constitutional security given to those who have been charged with the federal crime.

X. Article 85

X. Article 87

X. Article 99 The lawyer does not claim that the court does not provide an important guarantee of independence and fairness. "The defendant does not claim that the complete rights stipulated in Article 105 will not be given. These rights include prior notice of lawyer agency and complaint. See 6 U. S. T. OP 3396. In fact, the defendant will use all the constitutional security given to those who have been charged with the federal crime.

X. Article 85

X. Article 87

X. Article 99

2. Prisoners of war, once they have had the opportunity to be convicted or sentenced, have committed acts not prohibited by the laws of the warring powers or by the international law in force at the time they were committed.

Prisoners of war have no possibility of moral or physical compulsion to plead guilty to the acts charged.

Prisoners of war are never allowed the opportunity to be convicted, to assume their own defense, or to have the assistance of a competent counsel or lawyer.

Article 99 prohibits the detention of prisoners of war under ex post facto laws and prohibits the compulsion to plead guilty.

This memorandum also records other primary rights granted to the criminal class of accused under the Constitution of the United States of America. All accused who are not mindful of their "prisoner of war" status are guaranteed these primary rights.

The defense has no opportunity, and certainly cannot, to admit that the actual crimes with which the defendants are charged were authorized by South American law at the time when these effects were likely to be committed. The first statements have yet to be made as to whether the accused were forced to accept their guilt or whether they have made actual efforts in this direction. The accused have been defended by competent counsel and have been given all their legal rights. Thus, note 99 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.

X. note 22

1. Prisoners of war shall have every opportunity of being interned only in rooms on land and of all guarantees of hygiene and well-being. Except in special cases justified by the interests of the prisoners themselves, they shall have no opportunity of being held in prison houses.

2. Prisoners of war interned in areas of suffering or where the climate is harmful to them shall be able to be transferred promptly to a place of suitable climate. The delay of power shall place prisoners of war in camps or camp formations according to their nationality, language and customs, provided that they are not otherwise separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces which served during the conquest.

The Defendants argue that Article 22 deprives the Court of personal jurisdiction, since it requires them to be returned to Panama and held together with other Panamanian prisoners who had participated in the armed conflict. The Court considers that there is no such requirement in Article 22, which concerns general conditions, not internet locations. The circumstances on which the Defendants base their case are that prisoners of war should not be interned with persons of different nationalities, languages and customs, and that they should not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces in which they were serving at the time of the attack. 6 U. S. T. Op 3336. According to the Defendants' interpretation, Article 22 requires that all prisoners of war belonging to the same armed forces be interned together in one prisoner-of-war camp. But this clearly cannot be the intention of Article 22, since internment in such conditions would likely be contrary to the general interest in a healthy and agreeable international situation. Moreover, the Defendant undermines Noriega's own argument by offering to keep him in a third country by mutual agreement, which would naturally separate him from the members of the Panamanian military in Panama. A more obvious interpretation of this provision is that it does not permit prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces of one country to be prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces of that country.

Furthermore, neither Article 22 nor anywhere in the Convention prohibits the delaying power from temporarily transferring prisoners of war to a place other than a detention center in connection with their trial. Since the Convention provides that prisoners of war are to be held accountable in civilian courts, it necessarily permits transfer to a place consistent with the reasonable conduct of such proceedings. It is inconceivable that the Convention, while permitting the criminal prosecution of prisoners of war, would require them to be confined in detention centers thousands of kilometers away from the courts and possibly to defend their protection.

The remaining provisions of the Convention referred to by Defendant Noriega do not substantially support his argument regarding jurisdiction. Article 12 of the Convention, which Norieg says requires deportation to a third country, actually limits the ability of the United States to carry out the following deportation:

"The possibility of prisoners being transferred from the catching country to a country considered a party to the treaty is limited to the catching country being satisfied that the sending country is willing and able to use the treaty. If prisoners are transferred under such living conditions, the responsibility for using the treaty rests with the receiving country while they are held." Finally, Noriega refers to Article 118 of the treaty, which requires that prisoners be released and repatriated "without delay after the cessation of hostilities." 6 U. S. T. at 3406. However, this condition is limited in note 119, which in fact takes into account the fact that prisoners of war "have every opportunity to be held until the completion of such responsibility and, if necessary, until the execution of the sentence, if they are found criminally responsible for the commission of a crime." 6 U. S. T. at 3408. Because Noriega has been indicted, note 119 allows him to remain in U. S. custody despite the cessation of combat operations. X. Extradition Treaty between Panama and the United States of America

The Defendants, in effect, argue that the Third Geneva Chamber has deprived them of jurisdiction because they have no opportunity to be extradited from Panama to the United States for the crimes with which they are charged. They base their argument not on the wording of the Convention, but rather on the Red Cross Commentary to the Third Geneva Convention (the "Commentary"), which states, regarding note 85:

[In general, consequences unrelated to the state of war are likely to be grounds for criminal prosecution only if they are punishable under the law of both the detaining State and, for example, the State of origin. In parallel, one may refer to extradition agreements and generally accepted standards for extradition. Acts that cannot be extradited cannot be punished by the commanding State. It is possible to consider whether prosecution in the home country is possible. If the answer is negative, the prisoner of war is not bound to owe allegiance to the courts of the aggressing State. III International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 419, J. Pictet (Ed. 1960).

In the first place, the statement of the Red Cross needs to emphasize that according to the creator's views, it is only a basis to follow the footprints or not. In the sentence of "Geneva III", no one tells anyone that the judicial rights of the state court are limited to the atrocities involved in this issue. The defendant estimates this restriction from the Geneva Convention. However, the Supreme Court has decided that the contract is obliged to predict this restriction, so that international contracts take over the jurisdiction of domestic courts.

If the defendant is guilty of the United States and its alcoho l-provision laws, there is no chance to avoid convicted (to the defendant) unless the contract (the defendant) is exempted (the defendant). "Of course, there is no direct sentence that gives such exemptions to the contract. Why is he obliged to serve? If this was considered by the parties, why could he not express it? Is it?

Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 611, 47 S. CT. 531, 537, 71 L. ED. 。 In the first place, the Red Cross's statement needs to emphasize that in accordance with the creator's views, it is only a basis for presenting the footprints in accordance with politics. In the sentence of "Geneva III", no one tells anyone that the judicial rights of the state court are limited to the atrocities involved in this issue. The defendant estimates this restriction from the Geneva Convention. However, the Supreme Court has decided that the contract is obliged to predict this restriction, so that international contracts take over the jurisdiction of domestic courts.

Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 611, 47 S. CT. 531, 537, 71 L. ED. 。 In the first place, the statement of the Red Cross needs to emphasize that according to the creator's views, it is only a basis to follow the footprints or not. In the sentence of "Geneva III", no one tells anyone that the judicial rights of the state court are limited to the atrocities involved in this issue. The defendant estimates this restriction from the Geneva Convention. However, the Supreme Court has decided that the contract is obliged to predict this restriction, so that international contracts take over the jurisdiction of domestic courts.

Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 611, 47 S. CT. 531, 537, 71 L. ED. 。

Furthermore, the explanation itself does not support the defendant's transaction. According to the observation, the agreement on issuance is likely to function as a "milestone", which is the guideline for determining the acts that should be sanctioned by the delay side in the same way. The defendant's claim was that the illegal drug round did not fit in the 13 atrocities in Panama and the United States. However, the defendant not only suggests the form of a crackfall that may be subject to a simple international law and may be eligible for delivery of drugs charged with the defendant. Lost the precedent appearance that it is directly considered between further agreements between Panama. Annotation of a single treaty on March 30, 1961, 18 U. S. T. 1407 T. I. Als. No. 6298, revised by a promise on the revision of the Single Act on March 25, 1972, 26 U. T. T. 1441, T. I. ALS. No. 8118, crimes related to the production, savings, and distribution of pharmaceuticals are "considered a crime issued in the issuing contract between the parties." 26 U. S. T. OP 1451-1452. Apart from this

The main duties of the Geneva Convention on POWs's prosecutions are to protect POWs from prosecutions that are regarded as simple in armed cases, as follows the overall footprints of their words and interpretations. The Geneva Treaty does not intend to provide exemptions for ordinary crimes that can be questioned about delayed troops before the beginning of military acts, and does not need to be interpreted. As a result, it is not applied to pursuing the defendant on the alleged violation of the state of the drug regarding drugs. In fact, a trial is not a representative of the first situation of the treaty, but indicates or shows that these procedures should be stopped at the reverse signal for the treaty. Furthermore, the explanation itself does not support the defendant's transaction. According to the observation, the agreement on issuance is likely to function as a "milestone", which is the guideline for determining the acts that should be sanctioned by the delay side in the same way. The defendant's claim was that the illegal drug round did not fit in the 13 atrocities in Panama and the United States. However, the defendant not only suggests the form of a crackfall that may be subject to a simple international law and may be eligible for delivery of drugs charged with the defendant. Lost the precedent appearance that it is directly considered between further agreements between Panama. Annotation of a single treaty on March 30, 1961, 18 U. S. T. 1407 T. I. Als. No. 6298, revised by a promise on the revision of the Single Act on March 25, 1972, 26 U. T. T. 1441, T. I. ALS. No. 8118, crimes related to the production, savings, and distribution of pharmaceuticals are "considered a crime issued in the issuing contract between the parties." 26 U. S. T. OP 1451-1452. Apart from this

The main duties of the Geneva Convention on POWs's prosecutions are to protect POWs from prosecutions that are regarded as simple in armed cases, as follows the overall footprints of their words and interpretations. The Geneva Treaty does not intend to provide exemptions for ordinary crimes that can be questioned about delayed troops before the beginning of military acts, and does not need to be interpreted. As a result, it is not applied to pursuing the defendant on the alleged violation of the state of the drug regarding drugs. In fact, a trial is not a representative of the first situation of the treaty, but indicates or shows that these procedures should be stopped at the reverse signal for the treaty. Furthermore, the explanation itself does not support the defendant's transaction. According to the observation, the agreement on issuance is likely to function as a "milestone", which is the guideline for determining the acts that should be sanctioned by the delay side in the same way. The defendant's claim was that the illegal drug round did not fit in the 13 atrocities in Panama and the United States. However, the defendant not only suggests the form of a crackfall that may be subject to a simple international law and may be eligible for delivery of drugs charged with the defendant. Lost the precedent appearance that it is directly considered between further agreements between Panama. Annotation of a single treaty on March 30, 1961, 18 U. S. T. 1407 T. I. Als. No. 6298, revised by a promise on the revision of the Single Act on March 25, 1972, 26 U. T. T. 1441, T. I. ALS. No. 8118, crimes related to the production, savings, and distribution of pharmaceuticals are "considered a crime issued in the issuing contract between the parties." 26 U. S. T. OP 1451-1452. Apart from this

The humanitarian position of the Geneva Conventions cannot be overstated, and it is strongly opposed to the defense's appeal to the courts. The Third Geneva Convention was adopted with the express purpose of protecting prisoners from later ruthless appeals due to their capture by persistent military forces. The entire treaty, an important principle of the liberal tendency, encourages a soft appeal based on the prisoner, who is not a powerful townsman and has little long-term justice. It is therefore necessary to accept the "noble motives" that had the opportunity to encourage him to violate the law. [25] It is the intention of this principle that these motives are in accordance with acts of war and the laws of war. In this case, the government is eager to charge the defendant with drug trafficking and other crimes related to drugs. Case law shows that, in fact, this is a suspected act by its own nature, completely lacking "noble motives", but it is preparing the Liberal tendency inappropriate to the lessons considered. IV. Unlawful Arrest

Noriega still seeks the dismissal of the charges based on the manner in which he was arrested before this Court, "due to the infiltration of the United States Government in Panama," which "offends conscience and does not comply with the law and generally accepted humanitarian measures." In this regard, he declares that the Court is obliged to waive its jurisdiction over his personality. In support of this statement, Noriega has practically stated that the infiltration in Panama violates not only international law, but also the following legal procedural forum of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a candidate, he practically declares the inaccessibility of violations of the Constitution and treaties, and that the Court is obliged to dismiss the charges, using its own supervisory capacity, recruiting Noriega to the Court and not resolving the Court's role in the alleged illegal acts of the Government.

A. Report on the following legal procedures in conjunction with Article 5 of the Constitution

It is generally accepted that the manner in which a defendant is brought to court does not usually affect the government's ability to convict. The Ker-Frisbee theory takes into account that a court does not lose its power to convict a defendant because the defendant's presence in court was illegally secured. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30 L. Ed. 421 (1886); Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509, 96 L. Ed. 541 (1952). The validity of the Ker-Frisbee theory is established in United States v. Winter:

[We are] virtually certain that under the unchanging jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and its neighbours, a criminal defendant, whether he is a master or a resident of another country, whether he is arrested on the soil of the United States or abroad, has no safe means of challenging the district court's theory of his custody on the ground that his custody was wrongfully taken.

509 F. 2d. at 985-86. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F. 2d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 1986), certificate denied, 480 U. S. C. 919, 107 S. Ct. 1377, 94 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1987); see also United States v. Postal, 589 F. 2d at 873 ("A defendant ordinarily cannot plead the illegality of his decision without asserting judicial jurisdiction"). Thus, to deprive a court of judicial jurisdiction, it is not enough for a defendant to plead that his arrest was illegal.

Noriega does not protest the effectiveness of the car frisbee standard, but instead relies on the exclusion of Toscanino created by the second donation. UNITED STATES V. Toscanino, 500 F. 2D 267 (2D CIR. 1974). In this case, the defendant has actually expressed an objection to the jurisdiction of the court, but the defendant actually noted that torture and abuse had illegally accepted his existence. In order to support his statement, the defendant actually steals him from Uruguay, covers his finger with metal force, washing his nose, forcibly injected other liquids into the anus, and further injected other liquids. He made a proposal to prove that he added a long, endless torture to attach an electrode to the genitals. Court faced these charges decided to give the results of government's tort, and said, "To the constitutional rights of the government's intentional, unnecessary and irrational defendant's personality. If it was acquired as a result of the invasion, we believe that the following judicial procedures are strongly required so that the court will decide to strip the jurisdiction. " 275 pages. The court rely on the high court's conclusion.

Using Toscanino, the types of government acts that are important in justifying this rapid agent were abandoned, thus elucidated by the second district, and were narrowed down, 510, 510. F. 2D 62 (2nd district), certificate, certificate are rejected, 421 U. S. 1001, 95 S. CT. 2400, 44 L. ED. 2D 668 (1975) [Luyan V. Hengler]. The court has violated the following legal procedures and concludes that the abandonment in this case will be justified only if the defendant justifies "torture, crispness, and similar malicious acts". 。 65 pages. That act must be "shocking conscience". Same up. Noriega claims that the death, injury and injury of property in Panama "shock the conscience", as a result of the exception of Taskanino narrowed by Ruhan vs Gangler. Noriega has not protested the effectiveness of the car frisbee standard, but instead relies on the exclusion of the Toscanino created by the second district. UNITED STATES V. Toscanino, 500 F. 2D 267 (2D CIR. 1974). In this case, the defendant has actually expressed an objection to the jurisdiction of the court, but the defendant actually noted that torture and abuse had illegally accepted his existence. In order to support his statement, the defendant actually steals him from Uruguay, covers his finger with metal force, washing his nose, forcibly injected other liquids into the anus, and further injected other liquids. He made a proposal to prove that he added a long, endless torture to attach an electrode to the genitals. Court faced these charges decided to give the results of government's tort, and said, "To the constitutional rights of the government's intentional, unnecessary and irrational defendant's personality. If it was acquired as a result of the invasion, we believe that the following judicial procedures are strongly required so that the court will decide to strip the jurisdiction. " 275 pages. The court rely on the high court's conclusion.

Using Toscanino, the types of government acts that are important in justifying this rapid agent were abandoned, thus elucidated by the second district, and were narrowed down, 510, 510. F. 2D 62 (2nd district), certificate, certificate are rejected, 421 U. S. 1001, 95 S. CT. 2400, 44 L. ED. 2D 668 (1975) [Luyan V. Hengler]. The court has violated the following legal procedures and concludes that the abandonment in this case will be justified only if the defendant justifies "torture, crispness, and similar malicious acts". 。 65 pages. That act must be "shocking conscience". Same up. Noriega claims that the death, injury and injury of property in Panama "shock the conscience", as a result of the exception of Taskanino narrowed by Ruhan vs Gangler. Noriega does not protest the effectiveness of the car frisbee standard, but instead relies on the exclusion of Toscanino created by the second donation. UNITED STATES V. Toscanino, 500 F. 2D 267 (2D CIR. 1974). In this case, the defendant has actually expressed an objection to the jurisdiction of the court, but the defendant actually noted that torture and abuse had illegally accepted his existence. In order to support his statement, the defendant actually steals him from Uruguay, covers his finger with metal force, washing his nose, forcibly injected other liquids into the anus, and further injected other liquids. He made a proposal to prove that he added a long, endless torture to attach an electrode to the genitals. Court faced these charges decided to give the results of government's tort, and said, "To the constitutional rights of the government's intentional, unnecessary and irrational defendant's personality. If it was acquired as a result of the invasion, we believe that the following judicial procedures are strongly required so that the court will decide to strip the jurisdiction. " 275 pages. The court rely on the high court's conclusion.

Before that, to distinguish the substance of Noriegi's complaint, the Court must satisfy the threshold issue of upholding Toscanino's viability in light of further Supreme Court findings and the circumstances of Chapter 11. The Government argues that Toscanino was inflated by the Supreme Court, particularly in relation to the INS V Court's findings. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 82 L. ed. 2d 778 (1984); United States v. Krus, 445 U. S. 463, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 63 L. ed. 2d 537 (1980). In Lopez-Mendiasis, immigration authorities subsequently searched the premises of the defendant, an illegal alien in another country, without a warrant or arrest warrant and without the consent of the defendant's employer. The Court reversed the lower court's finding that the deportation was void and found that the arrests, searches, and interrogations were in fact unlawful. 468 U. S. Op 1039, 104 S. Ct. At 3483-84. Similarly, in the Crius case, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant did not in fact have an opportunity to claim procedural immunity simply because his appearance in court was caused by an unlawful arrest, and that "the defendant himself cannot be considered as oppressed 'fruit,' and the lawlessness of his detention does not enable him to take the government to justify his guilt by any method other than presenting evidence entirely untainted by police misconduct." "445 U. S. at 474, 100 S. Ct. Ct. Op 1252. [26] In this case, the defendant challenged his identification in court as a result of his arrest without necessary cause.

These precedents are different from Toscanino and, as a result, do not justify the government's position. There is nothing similar to the government's ruthless action of "giving conscience" that Toscanino addressed, and in kind, it merely adopts the Carr-Frisbee consecutive rule that illegal arrests cannot be considered grounds for judicial pursuit without additional criteria. As Toscanino shows, there is a difference between elementary illegality and conscience-shattering heinousness.

The government claims that it was at least rejected in the headquarters, including when Taskanino was regarded as a good law. In the Joint States before Rosental, 793 F. 2D at 1232, the 11th Appeal District Court stated that "the court did not recognize the task of Tascanino," and the first conclusion of the US to Derby's occupation, 744. f. 2D 1508 (11th CIR. 1984), rejected certificate, 471 U. S. 1100, 105 S. CT. 2322, 85 L. ED. 2D 841 (1985). It is only an expanded interpretation and explained, and directly describes that "recent cases have not actually excluded the limited possibilities of Keru Frisbe theory of Keru Frisbe theory." "I say. The same book, page 1531. The defendant in the derby case was actually stolen by Honduras, contrary to his own intention, and a trial in the United States, but" Basic illegal abduction is the next legal procedure. He did not talk about the government's shocking action, which was enough to be conjugated. "I do not say. 20 (Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F. 2D at 66). In this method, judicial support is not justified:" If you follow the second ward. " The same page 1531. (My note). More than that, in the case of Rosenthal, this problem was not straightforward because the appeal was not made. The government claims that it has been rejected at least in the head district, including when Tascanino is considered a good law. In the Joint States before Rosental, 793 F. 2D at 1232, the 11th Appeal District Court stated that "the court did not recognize the task of Tascanino," and the first conclusion of the US to Derby's occupation, 744. f. 2D 1508 (11th CIR. 1984), rejected certificate, 471 U. S. 1100, 105 S. CT. 2322, 85 L. ED. 2D 841 (1985). It is only an expanded interpretation and explained, and directly describes that "recent cases have not actually excluded the limited possibilities of Keru Frisbe theory of Keru Frisbe theory." "I say. The same book, page 1531. The defendant in the derby case was actually stolen by Honduras, contrary to his own intention, and a trial in the United States, but" Basic illegal abduction is the next legal procedure. He did not talk about the government's shocking action, which was enough to be conjugated. "I do not say. 20 (Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F. 2D at 66). In this method, judicial support is not justified:" If you follow the second ward. " The same page 1531. (My note). More than that, in the case of Rosenthal, this problem was not straightforward because the appeal was not made. The government claims that it was at least rejected in the headquarters, including when Taskanino was regarded as a good law. In the Joint States before Rosental, 793 F. 2D at 1232, the 11th Appeal District Court stated that "the court did not recognize the task of Tascanino," and the first conclusion of the US to Derby's occupation, 744. f. 2D 1508 (11th CIR. 1984), rejected certificate, 471 U. S. 1100, 105 S. CT. 2322, 85 L. ED. 2D 841 (1985). It is only an expanded interpretation and explained, and directly describes that "recent cases have not actually excluded the limited possibilities of Keru Frisbe theory of Keru Frisbe theory." "I say. The same book, page 1531. The defendant in the derby case was actually stolen by Honduras, contrary to his own intention, and a trial in the United States, but" Basic illegal abduction is the next legal procedure. He did not talk about the government's shocking action, which was enough to be conveyed. "I do not say. 20 (Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F. 2D at 66). In this method, judicial support is not justified:" If you follow the second ward. " The same page 1531. (My note). More than that, in the case of Rosenthal, this problem was not straightforward because the appeal was not made.

They were injured and destroyed their property as a result of the invasion. [28] However, the applied precedent suggests that the restrictions on clause on proper procedures are "applicable only when the government's activity in question infringes the defendant's protected rights." I am. The United States Payer Case, 447 U. S. 727, 737 N. 9, 100 S. CT. 2439, 2447 N. 9, 65 L. ED. 425 U. S. 484, 490, 96 S. CT. 1646, 1650, 48 L. Ed. 2D 113 (1976) (many opinions)). Other rulings mentioned by Toscanino and Noliga do not impair this principle, and there is no suggesting that thir d-party procedures can become Vicarna. For example, "Rochin vs California" case (Rochin V. California, Supra) (forced to take out the evidence of the defendant's stomach by a government investigator), "Toscanino". Incident (UNITED STATES V. Toscanino, Supra) (A claim for cruel physical torture by a government investigator is sufficient to show the appropriate procedure case in the procedure), "United States Fernande z-Caro" Incident (UNITED STATES V. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893 (S. D. Tex. 1987) (same)). They were injured and destroyed their property as a result of the invasion. [28] However, the applied precedent suggests that the restrictions on clause on proper procedures are "applicable only when the government's activity in question infringes the defendant's protected rights." I am. The United States Payer Case, 447 U. S. 727, 737 N. 9, 100 S. CT. 2439, 2447 N. 9, 65 L. ED. 425 U. S. 484, 490, 96 S. CT. 1646, 1650, 48 L. Ed. 2D 113 (1976) (many opinions)). Other rulings mentioned by Toscanino and Noliga do not impair this principle, and there is no suggesting that thir d-party procedures can become Vicarna. For example, "Rochin vs California" case (Rochin V. California, Supra) (forced to take out the evidence of the defendant's stomach by a government investigator), "Toscanino". Incident (UNITED STATES V. Toscanino, Supra) (A claim for cruel physical torture by a government investigator is sufficient to show the appropriate procedure case in the procedure), "United States Fernande z-Caro" Incident (UNITED STATES V. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893 (S. D. Tex. 1987) (same)). They were injured and destroyed their property as a result of the invasion. [28] However, the applied precedent suggests that the restrictions on clause on proper procedures are "applicable only when the government's activity in question infringes the defendant's protected rights." I am. The United States Payer Case, 447 U. S. 727, 737 N. 9, 100 S. CT. 2439, 2447 N. 9, 65 L. ED. 425 U. S. 484, 490, 96 S. CT. 1646, 1650, 48 L. Ed. 2D 113 (1976) (many opinions)). Other rulings mentioned by Toscanino and Noliga do not impair this principle, and there is no suggesting that thir d-party procedures can become Vicarna. For example, "Rochin vs California" case (Rochin V. California, Supra) (forced to take out the evidence of the defendant's stomach by a government investigator), "Toscanino". Incident (UNITED STATES V. Toscanino, Supra) (A claim for cruel physical torture by a government investigator is sufficient to show the appropriate procedure case in the procedure), "United States Fernande z-Caro" Incident (UNITED STATES V. Fernandez-Caro, 677 F. Supp. 893 (S. D. Tex. 1987) (same)).

Moreover, in certain limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of one party to protect the rights of the other, e. g., Secretary of Stat of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 104 S. Ct. 2839, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786 (1984); Griswart v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586 (1953), without regard to the term "third party" or "jus The doctrine of "terti" only affects the question of the personality of the party who can present a legal claim, and does not provide a reason to expand the rights and means of legal protection if the claim is met. In this case, Mr. Noriaga not only refers to the procedural rights of third parties, but also argues for the dismissal of the case against him due to the alleged violation of these rights. However, the rights of the Panamanian victims whom Norieg defends, none of whom are defendants, are not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. In this context, the only party with an interest in seeing the charges against Norieg dismissed is Norieg. Norieg is therefore not simply seeking to provide a means of protecting the rights of others, but is instead seeking to expand the substantive scope of his Clausura case, based on the doctrines of due process and rosés standi ("third parties"). B. Violations of International Law In addition to his procedural claims, Norieg alleges that the invasion of Panama violated international treaties and principles of customary international law, namely Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations,[29] Article 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,[17][30] Articles 23(b) and 25 of the Hague Convention,[31] Article 3 of the First Geneva Convention, and Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. [32]

First, it is important to note that a private citizen has no right to speak of a breach of an international agreement in the absence of disobedience on the part of the government of the attacked state. Moreover, the Carr-Frisbee doctrine makes it clear that a breach of international law does not, in and of itself, deprive a court of jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the contract contains specific language on the subject. United States v. Post, 589 F. 2d at 875-76 n. 19; Kok v. United States, 288 U. S. 102, 53 S. Ct. 102, 53 S. Ct. 305, 77 L. Ed. 641 (1933); Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. at 611, 47 S. Ct. at 537. Thus, to avoid asserting the court's individual jurisdiction, Noriega must justify that the contract in question is considered self-executing in the sense of granting personal driver's licenses to residents of the signatory states, and that the contract itself expresses a "self-limitation of the jurisdiction of the United States, and therefore of the jurisdiction of its courts." The United States opposes Postal.

According to the general principles of international law, physiologists do not have the right to protest the violation of the international agreement unless the sovereign side is independent. United States v. Hensel, 699 F. 2D 18, 30 (1st CIR.), Certificate Denied, 461 U. S. 958, 103 S. CT. 2431, 77 L. ED. 2D 1317 (1983); Henman , 896 F. 2D at 263; United States v. Williams, 617 F. 2D 1063, 1090 (5th CIR. 1980) (EN BANC) ("The Rights of International Law are not individuals, but not sovereignty. ), United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F. 2D AT 1232 ("It is" the foreign government that has the right to appeal for no n-compliance under international law. It is a nation that violates the Treaty to protect sovereign interest, and to evaluate whether or not sovereignment has been infringed and whether compensation is needed for the infringement. "United states v. Zabane, 837 F. 2D 1249, 1261 (5th CIR. 1988). United states v. 1025, 1030 (2D CIR. 1985); United States V. Cordero, 668 F. 2D 32, 37-38 (1st CIR. 1981); United States V. Valot, 625 F. 2D 308, 310 (9th CIR. 1980 ) Ruyan V. GENGER, 625 F. 2D 308, 310 (9th CIR. 1980); (RestateMent (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, ง 115, Comment E (1965)). In accordance with this principle, this contract is interpreted as a claim.

The United Nations Charter, O. A. S. Charter, and the Hague Treaty mentioned by Noriga are not taken into account. Freeze, these provisions impose a local communal base that regulates the actions of each country in the relationship with friendly countries, and talks about personal rights and personality rights. isn't it. Frolov v. The Russian Socialist Republics, 761 F. 2D AT 374 (The provisions formulated in "Wide Overall Characteristics" suggest that they are "basic and not laws and regulations". ); Te l-Rs, V. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2D 774, 809 (D. C. CIR. 1984) (Bork, J.), Agree) (Article 1 and 2 of the International Union Charter "The common" purpose and principle are included, and some of them have expressed only ambitious, and there is nothing reasonably interpreted as the intended judicial forced at the request of individuals. " The same certificate is rejected, 470 U. S. 1003, 105 S. CT. 1354, 84 L. ED. 2D 377 (1985); Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F. 2D at 66-67 (A Private Person DOES NOT STANDING TO Refer to a note 2 (4) of the uncharter or a note 20 [17] Of The O. A. Charter; [33] Handel V. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C. D. Cal. 1985) The right of the individual); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F. 2 D. The UN Charter, O. A. S. The regulations impose a local communal base that regulates the actions of each country in the relationship with friendly countries, and does not talk about personal rights or personality rights. v. The Union of The Russian Socialist Republics, 761 F. 2D AT 374 (The article formulated in the "Wide Tour Characteristics" suggests that it is a description of the basics, not a law. " );); Libyan arab republic, 726 F. 2D 774, 809 (D. C. CIR. 1984) (Bork, J.) The purpose and the principle are "included, and some of them have expressed only ambitious, and there is no reason to be reasonably interpreted as the intended judicial forced at the request of individuals."). The certificate is rejected, 470 U. S. 1003, 105 S. CT. 1354, 84 L. ED. 2D 377 (1985); Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F. 2D at 66-67 To a note 2 (4) of the uncharter or a note 20 [17] Of The O. A. Charter; [33] Handel V. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C. D. Cal. 1985) The right to sue is not granted); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F. 2 D. The UN Charter, O. A. S., and the Hague Treaty mentioned by Noriga are not taken into account. Freeze, these provisions impose a local communal base that regulates the actions of each country in the relationship with friendly countries, and talks about personal rights and personality rights. isn't it. Frolov v. The Russian Socialist Republics, 761 F. 2D AT 374 (The provisions formulated in "Wide Overall Characteristics" suggest that they are "basic and not laws and regulations". ); Te l-Rs, V. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2D 774, 809 (D. C. CIR. 1984) (Bork, J.), Agree) (Article 1 and 2 of the International Union Charter "The common" purpose and principle are included, and some of them have expressed only ambitious, and there is nothing reasonably interpreted as the intended judicial forced at the request of individuals. " The same certificate is rejected, 470 U. S. 1003, 105 S. CT. 1354, 84 L. ED. 2D 377 (1985); Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F. 2D at 66-67 (A Private Person DOES NOT STANDING TO Refer to a note 2 (4) of the uncharter or a note 20 [17] Of The O. A. Charter; [33] Handel V. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C. D. Cal. 1985) Do not give the right to the individual); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F. 2 D.

One could argue that resorting to the aforementioned legal system in extraordinary circumstances such as those in this case is a kind of judicial evasion. Noriega is the Panamanian government, at least the de facto head of state, and thus worthy of challenging the alleged violation of the treaty. If his displeasure were to be set aside because he and his allies were removed from power and a friendly new government was established, the principle of sovereignty would be further subverted. This argument is not without force, but there are more compelling answers. First, as mentioned above, the United States has consistently refused to recognize the Noriega government as the legitimate government of Panama. Second, Noriega annulled the results of the Panamanian presidential elections held just before the alleged violation of the treaty. Thus, the point is made that Noriega's departure from power somehow deprives the incumbent government of the ability to challenge the treaty under the applicable treaty. Finally, there is no provision or presumption in the cited treaty that would allow the Court to ignore the absence of a claim or argument on the part of the incumbent duly constituted government of Panama. Thus, Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which provides for the humanitarian treatment of civilians and other parties not involved in the war, applies to armed conflicts "not of an international character," i. e., internal or civil wars of a purely internal character. 6 U. S. T. at 3116. American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 769 (N. D. Cal. 1989); L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. Thus, Article 3 does not apply to the military intervention of the United States in Panama.

Finally, the defendants refer to comment 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, which prohibits military crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Charter established the procedures by which the Nuremberg Tribunal, established by the Allied powers after World War II, would try and punish the principal war criminals of the European Axis powers.* The government argues, in effect, that the foundations laid at Nuremberg were developed specifically for the prosecution of war criminals in World War II and do not apply to U. S. military actions in Panama. The Tribunal has no choice but to agree. Robert H. Jackson, the lead U. S. defense attorney at the Nuremberg Trials, said, "If certain acts that do not comply with the agreements qualify as atrocities, they qualify as atrocities whether committed by the United States or by Germany. We are not prepared to set a standard of opposition for criminal acts that we do not wish to be opposed." [34] At the very least, the defendants have failed to justify how the Nuremberg Charter, or, if one hopes, its non-compliance, applies to the charges. As mentioned above, the Carr-Frisbee theory clearly indicates z.

C. Supervisory authority

Despite the defendant Noriega, despite the fact that it was not possible to present valid defends based on the right procedures and the principle of international law, the court applied for the court's unique supervision right by the defendant Noriega. Do not end this matter. Noriega claims that the court will invade Panama and to trial Noriega by exercising the jurisdiction against Noriega, and claims that it will be the party. Despite the fact that the defendant Noriega could not present valid defends based on the proper procedures and the principle of international law, the court was based on the defendant Noriega on behalf of the court's inherent supervision. Since I applied, I will not end this matter. Noriega claims that the court will invade Panama and to trial Noriega by exercising the jurisdiction against Noriega, and claims that it will be the party. Despite the defendant Noriega, despite the fact that it was not possible to present valid defends based on the right procedures and the principle of international law, the court applied for the court's unique supervision right by the defendant Noriega. Do not end this matter. Noriega claims that the court will invade Panama and to trial Noriega by exercising the jurisdiction against Noriega, and claims that it will be the party.

The theory of supervision ability may function to protect the defendant's rights in individual cases, but it is "mainly designed and used to maintain the perfection of the judicial system". , "Prevent the Federal Court from being involved in the government's misconduct." United States vs. Omni International Company, 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. MD. 1986) (United States V. Payner, 447 U. S. at 744 , 100 S. CT. At 2451). Ct. At 2451 (Marshall, J., Dissting)). As a result, the court has undergone the positive or convicted of this doctrine in the face of a serious or widespread abuse of prosecutors. See the omni International Corporation, the previous post, and the precedent quoted there. Thus, the right to judge is essentially regarded as constitutional violations or laws and regulations, but at least the court is considered contrary to fairness and faith, suppressing the act of being inexplicable, and correcting the judicial means. It is considered. UNITED STES V. Leslie, 783 F. 2D 541, 569 (5th Cir. 1986) , 1978, 76 L. Ed. 2D 96 (1983), and McNabb V. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340, 63 S. CT. 608, 613, 87 L. The theory of supervising ability is the defendant's right in individual cases Although it may work to protect, it is "mainly designed and used to maintain the integrity of the judicial system", and that the government's misconduct is "the Federal Court is involved in the Federal Court. It is to prevent the United States, Omni International, 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. MD. USA, 447 U. S. at 744, 100 S. CT. At 2451). As a result, the court has undergone the positive or convicted of this doctrine in the face of a serious or widespread abuse of prosecutors. See the omni International Corporation, the previous post, and the precedent quoted there. Thus, the right to judge is essentially regarded as constitutional violations or laws and regulations, but at least the court is considered contrary to fairness and faith, suppressing the act of being inexplicable, and correcting the judicial means. It is considered. UNITED STES V. Leslie, 783 F. 2D 541, 569 (5th Cir. 1986) , 1978, 76 L. Ed. 2D 96 (1983), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340, 63 S. CT. 608, 613, 87 L. The theory of supervision ability is to protect the defendant's rights in individual cases It is possible to function, but it is "mainly designed and used to maintain the perfection of the judicial system", and "prevents the federal court from being involved in the government" in government misconduct. The United States Omni International, 634 F. Supp. 1414, 1438 (D. MD. 1986) (447 U. S. at 744, 100 S. CT. U. S. at 744, 100 S. CT. At 2451). As a result, the court has undergone the positive or convicted of this doctrine in the face of a serious or widespread abuse of prosecutors. See the omni International Corporation, the previous post, and the precedent quoted there. Thus, the right to judge is essentially regarded as constitutional violations or laws and regulations, but at least the court is considered contrary to fairness and faith, suppressing the act of being inexplicable, and correcting the judicial means. It is considered. UNITED STES V. Leslie, 783 F. 2D 541, 569 (5th Cir. 1986) , 1978, 76 L. Ed. 2D 96 (1983), and McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340, 63 S. CT. 608, 613, 87 L.

The government, on the other hand, is in line with the cour t-specific supervision, and that Noriega is not in a position to suspend the execution based on the alleged violation of the three rights. Panama or Panama country. Therefore, the government's position seems to have infringed the defendant's constitution or legal rights in order for a court to exercise its own supervision. This position highlights the decisive difference between the introduction of supervision and the conclusion of the judiciary based on the other constitution and the violation of laws and regulations. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the introduction of supervision has created an independent legal system, and does not depend on the presence or absence of constitutional violations or laws and regulations, so that the person's personal rights of the defendant are not infringed. Because it does not exist. It has no decisive meaning. (For the relevance of supervising ability and the constitution and laws and regulations, please refer to United States v. Leslie, 783 F. 2D at 569-71). This is because the suspension of prosecution and other defenses occur from the necessary constitutional provisions. The government claims that the government is not in a position to suspend the execution based on the alleged violation of the three rights, in line with the court's unique supervision ability. Panama or Panama country. Therefore, the government's position seems to have infringed the defendant's constitution or legal rights in order for a court to exercise its own supervision. This position highlights the decisive difference between the introduction of supervision and the conclusion of the judiciary based on the other constitution and the violation of laws and regulations. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the introduction of supervision has created an independent legal system, and does not depend on the presence or absence of constitutional violations or laws and regulations, so that the person's personal rights of the defendant are not infringed. Because it does not exist. It has no decisive meaning. (For the relevance of supervising ability and the constitution and laws and regulations, please refer to United States v. Leslie, 783 F. 2D at 569-71). This is because the suspension of prosecution and other defenses occur from the necessary constitutional provisions. The government, on the other hand, is in line with the cour t-specific supervision, and that Noriega is not in a position to suspend the execution based on the alleged violation of the three rights. Panama or Panama country. Therefore, the government's position seems to have infringed the defendant's constitution or legal rights in order for a court to exercise its own supervision. This position highlights the decisive difference between the introduction of supervision and the conclusion of the judiciary based on the other constitution and the violation of laws and regulations. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the introduction of supervision has created an independent legal system, and does not depend on the presence or absence of constitutional violations or laws and regulations, so that the person's personal rights of the defendant are not infringed. Because it does not exist. It has no decisive meaning. (For the relevance of supervising ability and the constitution and laws and regulations, please refer to United States v. Leslie, 783 F. 2D at 569-71). This is because the suspension of prosecution and other defenses occur from the necessary constitutional provisions.

The majority ruling in the Payer incident (above), which is mentioned by the government, is actually characteristic, and therefore, the coaching authority in this case is not limited to the court. In the Payer case, the Supreme Court announced that it would not be able to use the law of supervisory authority to suppress evidence received in violation of the fourth orthodontic. Since illegal search and seizure violate the defendant's own constitutional rights, evidence is eliminated according to Article 4 of the Correction, so this method is "Article 4 of these courts. The court refused to recognize different results in accordance with the supervisor Doctrine, in response to the profound balance of the profound interests. 447 U. S. at 733, 100 S. CT. Ct. 2445. Court concerns were only to prevent the use of supervision rights to "detour" the established law of Article 4 of the Constitution, but the decision is the amount of conventional supervision rights. It is not a restriction, and it is not a "excess" of these authority. 447 U. S. AT 735, N. 8, 100 S. CT. Ct. Ct. OP 2446, N. 8. The illegal investigation discussed in the Lander case is the level of the widespread and shocking illegal act imposed in the Lander case. Not reached. The majority ruling in the Payer case (above) mentioned by the government is actually characteristic, and therefore do not limit the coaching authority in this case to this court. In the Payer case, the Supreme Court announced that it would not be able to use the law of supervisory authority to suppress evidence received in violation of the fourth orthodontic. Since illegal search and seizure violate the defendant's own constitutional rights, evidence is eliminated according to Article 4 of the Correction, so this method is "Article 4 of these courts. The court refused to recognize different results in accordance with the supervisor Doctrine, in response to the profound balance of the profound interests. 447 U. S. at 733, 100 S. CT. Ct. 2445. Court concerns were only to prevent the use of supervision rights to "detour" the established law of Article 4 of the Constitution, but the decision is the amount of conventional supervision rights. It is not a restriction, and it is not a "excess" of these authority. 447 U. S. AT 735, N. 8, 100 S. CT. Ct. Ct. OP 2446, N. 8. The illegal investigation discussed in the Lander case is the level of the widespread and shocking illegal act imposed in the Lander case. Not reached. The majority ruling in the Payer incident (above), which is mentioned by the government, is actually characteristic, and therefore, the coaching authority in this case is not limited to the court. In the Payer case, the Supreme Court announced that it would not be able to use the law of supervisory authority to suppress evidence received in violation of the fourth orthodontic. Since illegal search and seizure violate the defendant's own constitutional rights, evidence is eliminated according to Article 4 of the Correction, so this method is "Article 4 of these courts. The court refused to recognize different results in accordance with the supervisor Doctrine, in response to the profound balance of the profound interests. 447 U. S. at 733, 100 S. CT. Ct. 2445. Court concerns were only to prevent the use of supervision rights to "detour" the established law of Article 4 of the Constitution, but the decision is the amount of conventional supervision rights. It is not a restriction, and it is not a "excess" of these authority. 447 U. S. AT 735, N. 8, 100 S. CT. Ct. Ct. OP 2446, N. 8. The illegal investigation discussed in the Lander case is the level of the widespread and shocking illegal act imposed in the Lander case. Not reached.

Good sense, safety, and intentions assert that local government officials are equivalent to protecting the same code as the residents. The government of the law does not necessarily follow the law. Our government is a powerful and ugly leader. Whether it's good or evil, he teaches the whole nation by his own actions. Crime is transmitted. When the government commits the law, a contempt of the law is born, all people create laws for themselves, leading to anarchy. When a criminal law is used, the claim that the mission justifies the method, the claim that "the government has the ability to commit crime to secure the guilty of personal criminals" will lead to terrible retaliation. In this court, there is an obligation to make opposition to this disadvantage theory. Sense, safety, and intentions are equally claiming that local government officials protect the same norms as residents. The government of the law does not necessarily follow the law. Our government is a powerful and ugly leader. Whether it's good or evil, he teaches the whole nation by his own actions. Crime is transmitted. When the government commits the law, a contempt of the law is born, all people create laws for themselves, leading to anarchy. When a criminal law is used, the claim that the mission justifies the method, the claim that "the government has the ability to commit crime to secure the guilty of personal criminals" will lead to terrible retaliation. In this court, there is an obligation to make opposition to this disadvantage theory. Good sense, safety, and intentions assert that local government officials are equivalent to protecting the same code as the residents. The government of the law does not necessarily follow the law. Our government is a powerful and ugly leader. Whether it's good or evil, he teaches the whole nation by his own actions. Crime is transmitted. When the government commits the law, a contempt of the law is born, all people create laws for themselves, leading to anarchy. When a criminal law is used, the claim that the mission justifies the method, the claim that "the government has the ability to commit crime to secure the guilty of personal criminals" will lead to terrible retaliation. In this court, there is an obligation to make opposition to this disadvantage theory.

Perhaps one day this Court will introduce Justice Brandis's famous words, but now is not the time. For what we are facing is not the hypothetical above, but a military war in pursuit of foreign policy goals in which innocent people have unfortunately died. The motives for the military operation are open to speculation, but the stated goals are the invasion of American lives, the support of democracy, the preservation of the Panama Canal Agreement, and the extradition of Noriegui to the United States for trial on drug-related charges. [36] Because it was "in the midst of military operations in Panama" that the President ordered Noriegui's arrest, [37] Noriegui's arrest was linked to broader foreign policy. While the legitimacy of the invasion as authorized by the government should not be blindly accepted by this Court, Noriegui's defense has presented no evidence to the contrary, nor has it presented any evidence that actually strengthens the conclusion that the invasion was primarily a foreign policy pursuit. The report of the Panama-US Independent Commission of Inquiry, attached as an appendix to the defendants' filing, states that the invasion was primarily undertaken to advance economic interests.

*1538 This case involves not only the purpose of the law enforcement but also the purpose of foreign policy, so the evaluation of court's government acts is fundamentally changed, and the intention to exercise supervision is changed. In fact, it is a matter of whether the court can use its supervision as a shield and that armed conflict can be used as a "impact on conscience." Such declarations are not only contrary to the principles of political issues that prevent the court from determining the government's political department, but also in unprecedented judiciary interference in execution of foreign policy.

The Judicial Clinic of the Constitution is not limited to the federal court's ability to judge the Federal Court because it represents political issues, but nevertheless, the Supreme Court is Marburi vs. Madison case (5 U. S. C. C. Since (1 cranch) 137, 165-66, 2 L. ED. 60 (1803)), judicials have been classified as a judicial judicial right to judge. In this way, the exemption of the right to judge in political issues recognizes the systems of the constitutional division and chec k-an d-balance, rather than the constitutional doctrine. Baker vs. car, 369 U. S. 186, 210, 82 S. CT. 691, 706, 7L. ED. 2D 663 (1962).

The accurate contour of political issues (Political IsseSue Doctrine) is vague and still causes confusion [41], but the court is a breakthrough case Baker V. Carr case (above). ) Inspired by Judge BRENNAN's lawyer:

In any problem that is recognized as a political issue, [1] The constitutional duty to be entrusted to a political body that coordinates the problem is pushed to the forefront, or [2] or to solve it. It is impossible to find and have no regulated criteria, or it is impossible to solve the first policy decision without explicitly entrusted to no n-trial discretion [4] However, it is impossible to make an independent decision without despising the government's coordination department, or an unusual need to obey the political decision that has already been made without any doubt. One thing, [6], or that a different organization in the same problem may cause confusion when multiple statements are issued. *1538 This case involves not only the purpose of the law enforcement but also the purpose of foreign policy, so the evaluation of court's government acts is fundamentally changed, and the intention to exercise supervision is changed. In fact, it is a matter of whether the court can use its supervision as a shield and that armed conflict can be used as a "impact on conscience." Such declarations are not only contrary to the principles of political issues that prevent the court from determining the government's political department, but also in unprecedented judiciary interference in execution of foreign policy.

In any problem that is recognized as a political issue, [1] The constitutional duty to be entrusted to a political body that coordinates the problem is pushed to the forefront, or [2] or to solve it. It is impossible to find and have no regulated criteria, or it is impossible to solve the first policy decision without explicitly entrusted to no n-trial discretion [4] However, it is impossible to make an independent decision without despising the government's coordination department, or an unusual need to obey the political decision that has already been made without any doubt. One thing, [6], or that a different organization in the same problem may cause confusion when multiple statements are issued. *1538 This case involves not only the purpose of the law enforcement but also the purpose of foreign policy, so the evaluation of court's government acts is fundamentally changed, and the intention to exercise supervision is changed. In fact, it is a matter of whether the court can use its supervision as a shield and that armed conflict can be used as a "impact on conscience." Such declarations are not only contrary to the principles of political issues that prevent the court from determining the government's political department, but also in unprecedented judiciary interference in execution of foreign policy.

Work 217 OP 217, 82 S. CT. 710 The initial formula of baker, "Textual Coupling of the Question to The Political Branch", is in line with foreign policy. A wide range of issues related to administrative rights are assigned to the administrative division and legislative divisions in the constitution. [42] For example, in the Johnson vs. Eisentlger case, the Supreme Court opposes the legality, wisdom, wisdom, or validity of the Supreme Commander of the Supreme Commander in overseas or in a specific area. [42] He refused to consider dispute over military activities in China in China. 339 U. S. 763, 789, 70 S. CT. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950). This means that all cases and disputes that affect diplomatic relations are not subject to judicial examination. isn't it. The court has the right to judge whether the parliament or the government's actions are within the constitutional authority. For example, in the context of war and military operations, the problem of the possibility that the administrative government has usurped the exclusive authority of the parliament that declares the declaration of war is undoubtedly the subject of the judiciary. See Atlee V. LAIRD, 347 F. Supp. 689, 702 (E. D. Pa. 1972), Aff'd, 411 U. S. 911, 93 S. Work 217 OP 217, 82 S. CT. 710 The first formula of the baker is the "Textual Coupling of the Question to The Political Branch". A wide range of issues related to the administrative rights of foreign policy are assigned to the administrative department and legislative division in constitution. [42] For example, in the Johnson vs. Eisentlger case, the Supreme Court opposes the legality, wisdom, wisdom, or validity of the Supreme Commander of the Supreme Commander in overseas or in a specific area. [42] He refused to consider dispute over military activities in China in China. 339 U. S. 763, 789, 70 S. CT. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950). This means that all cases and disputes that affect diplomatic relations are not subject to judicial examination. isn't it. The court has the right to judge whether the parliament or the government's actions are within the constitutional authority. For example, in the context of war and military operations, the problem of the possibility that the administrative government has usurped the exclusive authority of the parliament that declares the declaration of war is undoubtedly the subject of the judiciary. See Atlee V. LAIRD, 347 F. Supp. 689, 702 (E. D. Pa. 1972), Aff'd, 411 U. S. 911, 93 S. Work 217 OP 217, 82 S. CT. 710 The initial formula of baker, "Textual Coupling of the Question to The Political Branch", is in line with foreign policy. A wide range of issues related to administrative rights are assigned to the administrative division and legislative divisions in the constitution. [42] For example, in the Johnson vs. Eisentlger case, the Supreme Court opposes the legality, wisdom, wisdom, or validity of the Supreme Commander of the Supreme Commander in overseas or in a specific area. [42] He refused to consider dispute over military activities in China in China. 339 U. S. 763, 789, 70 S. CT. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950). This means that all cases and disputes that affect diplomatic relations are not subject to judicial examination. isn't it. The court has the right to judge whether the parliament or the government's actions are within the constitutional authority. For example, in the context of war and military operations, the problem of the possibility that the administrative government has usurped the exclusive authority of the parliament that declares the declaration of war is undoubtedly the subject of the judiciary. See Atlee V. LAIRD, 347 F. Supp. 689, 702 (E. D. Pa. 1972), Aff'd, 411 U. S. 911, 93 S.

Noriega does not, and legally cannot, allege that President Bush overstepped his authority as commander in chief and ordered the invasion of Panama. Instead, he seeks recognition that the deaths of innocent civilians and the destruction of private property "offend conscience and violate the laws and norms of humanity." In fact, Noriega's appeal is a challenge to the morality of war itself. This is a political question in its most typical and primitive form. It raises the spirit of judicial control and control over foreign policy and calls into question the wisdom, fitness, and morality of the deployment. Questions such as under what circumstances armed conflict is or always is immoral are not for the courts to consider, but must be decided by the political branch of the authorities that the Constitution holds largely responsible for the country's participation in combat. [43] In this case, the decision to deploy troops to Panama was taken by the President as commander in chief, and in this case "reported only to his country, his political character, and his conscience." Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch), 165. The defense denounces the military action and the "brutality" that followed, and, having established the line of argument, suggests that the court has not authorized such action and has not authorized the fruits of such action, namely the arrests. The following argues that allowing the case to proceed would amount to judicial approval of the hostile actions that the defense denounces. As shown above, this argument does not acknowledge the constitutional separation of powers and functions. Any assumption that rejecting the defense's position means approving in any way the government's actions that are flagrant is inappropriate. There are other forums where government political activity can be complained about. To the extent that it is legally permissible to consider existing facts, we propose that the court consider this case within the framework of the issues formulated in the indictment and those defenses presented by the defendants.

The complexity of the Noria issue is also comforting in the absence of stereotypes to be identified and rehashed in court. In the case of Costa v. Lard, 471 F. 2d 1146 (2d Sir 1973), the United States had sought to impose a waiver on the inaccessibility of congressional punishment in the WR. 2 of the war. The same district decided that the trial actually gave rise to a political issue, in conjunction with Baker's second point, since the court had not had the opportunity to consider whether this effect on the escalation or termination of the war would accelerate. Similarly, the court in the case for the occupation of the cross for Reagan steadfastly refused to qualify whether the soldiers' support and US advisors were introduced into the "inevitable military personnel" of Salvador, and most affected the resolution and the comment on the constitutional warfare capability. The court concluded that it actually lacked the resources and skills to resolve the ambiguous issues of precedent regarding the Salvadoran military personnel and the clear disposition of the US role in the case. 558 F. Supp. at 898. Not so long ago, the Southern District of New York considered its resources to resolve an ambiguous case law issue regarding military action in Salvador and the absence of a clear disposition regarding the U. S. role.

If the Court cannot decide whether an airstrike is an escalation of a war or whether a missile deployment is a global impact, it seems not to be within our power to decide whether a war is immoral or under what circumstances. What should be the standard for determining when an armed conflict "shocks the conscience"? The defense lawyers talk a lot about the number of innocent civilians and the extent of material damage, but the Court cannot understand what this argument proves. At the same time, the Court is reminiscent of the opinion of then District Judge Warren E. Burger in another case affecting a foreign policy issue:

The fact that the appeal was brought to the Court, guided by a vague and confused theory that the judiciary can guarantee a speedy and satisfactory solution to one of the great problems of mankind, is not something that we, the judges, should look upon ourselves as. Elders defined by summoned elders. In policymaking on the great issues of defense and security, the people are, and should be, in a sense indebted to their elected representatives. But the most important and significant consequence of this is that while the people can change their elected representatives, they cannot change the judges of the United States. This elementary fact about the nature of our system seems to have gone unnoticed until now, but we should make it clear to our judges that we are not gods or god-like beings, but judicial officers with narrowly limited powers. Even if we were to dare to assume that we have the best judgment in such matters, our entire system of administration would suffer incalculable damage if judges were to attempt to put their own will above the will of Congress or the President. Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F. 2d 796, 799 (D. C. ir. 1963), cert. Geweigerd, 377 VS 933, 84 S. Ct. 1336, 12 L. ed. 2d 297 (1964).

Ultimately, even if we assume that the Court has the ability to declare the infiltration in Panama as shocking to the conscience, it is noteworthy that the exercise of supervisory power in this context does not apply to this prosecution for the reasons stated above. Since what the Court is essentially condemning is military infiltration and not law enforcement work, any "relief" will necessarily focus on the outcome and results of the armed incident rather than on the prosecution of Defendant Noriega for alleged violations of the drug laws. As a result, the Defendant's presumption that a judicial charge of violations should lead to the dismissal of the drug racket charges against him is considered erroneous.

In light of the above observations and views, I DENY the Defendants' numerous petitions for the jurisdiction of the Division Bench and the motion to dismiss with observations, and each of these petitions is BOUND and ORDERED.

Notes

[1] United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373 (SDFla. 1988).

[2] Defendant Del Cid's motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of the Comitat Posse Act, the Mansfield Corrections Act, and the secondary provisions of the Fifth Amendment has since been withdrawn and is therefore not before this Court. Notice to Defendant Del Cid of Withdrawal of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Further Jurisdiction (March 23, 1990).

[3] Defendant Noriega's Motion to Dismiss, 9 (September 15, 1988).

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Last modified: 27.08.2024

f very privacy l united hotel w real Manuel Antonio Noriega at 2, United States v. Noriega irond.info (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2,. ) (cr), available at irond.info Noriega to face federal drug charges in the United States. United States v. Noriega, F.3d , (11th Cir. ) (quoting United States v. Case.

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